The Hidden Costs of International Dispute Settlement: WTO Review of Domestic Anti-Dumping Decisions

Tarullo, Daniel K.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.351080

Cited by 11 publications

(7 citation statements)

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“…For instance, panels and the Appellate Body have been criticized for certain rulings on trade remedies for allegedly having disregarded the standard of review under Article 17.6(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Tarullo (2002) and Greenwald (2003), for example, are affirmative, while Durling (2003) and Leibovitz (2001) do not see an excess of mandate. 64 Pauwelyn argues that "[f]or a non-WTO rule to play a role in this process, (1) the WTO term in question must be broad and ambiguous enough to allow for input by other rules; and (2) the other rule must say (even within the relatively strict sense referred to in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention) is a matter of definition.…”

Section: Consultationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Indisputably Essential: The Economics of Dispute Settlement Institutions in Trade Agreements

Keck

Schropp

2007

SSRN Journal

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Economic theory has made considerable progress in explaining why sovereign countries cooperate in trade. Central to most theories of trade cooperation are issues of self-enforcement: The threat of reprisal by an aggrieved party maintains the initial balance of concessions and prevents opportunism. However, economic scholarship has been less coherent in explaining why countries choose to settle and enforce their trade disputes with the help of an impartial third party, a "trade court". Typically, economists focusing on the purpose of trade agreements have assumed away the very reasons why institutions are needed, since under standard assumptions, neither defection from the rules nor disputes are expected to occur. This paper is a step towards the formulation of a coherent economic theory of dispute settlement. It challenges traditional models of enforcement (primarily concerned with acts of punishment) for being insufficient in explaining the existence of dispute settlement institutions. We perform a comprehensive analysis of the economics of dispute settlement institutions and demonstrate to what extent the literatures of trade cooperation and dispute institutions are (and should be) interlinked. On the basis of these theories, we show that dispute settlement institutions in trade agreements may assume a variety of roles, including that of an information repository and disseminator, an honest broker, an arbitrator and calculator of damages, an active information gatherer or an adjudicator.

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Section: Consultationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Indisputably Essential: The Economics of Dispute Settlement Institutions in Trade Agreements

Keck

Schropp

2007

SSRN Journal

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“…Having also heard tales of arbitrary administrative practices directed against exporters in the course of 17 Thompson (1995). 18 I am also not rearguing the question of whether Article 17.6 is a significant or modest departure from generally applicable WTO standards of review, a point also discussed in Tarullo (2002). 19 Cunningham & Cribb (2003); Greenwald (2003).…”

Section: Dynamic Effects In Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Paved with good intentions: the dynamic effects of WTO review of anti-dumping action

Tarullo

2003

World Trade Review

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Virtually every national trade remedy measure challenged in WTO dispute settlement has resulted in at least partial victory for the exporting country. In the anti-dumping area, the special standard of review for national interpretations of Anti-Dumping agreement obligations has had little discernible effect on dispute settlement outcomes. This pattern, while applauded by some as promoting liberal trade values, may actually result in less trade liberalization. If important trading countries like the United States believe that the Appellate Body will undermine provisions intended to preserve their ability to use trade remedies, they may decline to negotiate further disciplines on the use of these remedies or, possibly, to enter multilateral negotiations entirely. Although insufficient information exists to reach definitive conclusions, recent developments suggest that such negative effects are occurring in the Doha Round.

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“…For simplicity we will assume that the loss from defection is su¢ ciently large to sustain cooperation under the ADA agreement once countries adopt an AD law. A primary contribution of the paper is to show that for each WTO member, the 7 Although history suggests that occasional disputes do arise, Tarullo (2002) and Bown (2005) discuss why AD disputes …led with the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) are relatively uncommon. 8 Unwillingness to engage in future trade liberalization or to enhance intellectual property enforcement, or an unwillingness to augment the WTO to address labor rights or environmental rights could be punishment strategies pursued by countries against a violator of the ADA agreement.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why Does the WTO Have an Antidumping Agreement?

Hartigan

Vandenbussche

2009

SSRN Journal

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This paper develops a model that o¤ers a plausible interpretation for the empirical observation of di¤usion of antidumping (AD) laws amongst 1 WTO members. Contrary to the regnant belief that this proliferation is driven mainly by retaliatory motives, our model shows that adoption and use of AD laws involve a cooperative act amongst WTO members in an in…nite horizon game. The di¤usion of AD laws need not result in a Prisonner's dilemma. Instead we show that the AD agreement of the WTO can serve as a risk-sharing vehicle amongst WTO members in response to adverse shocks incurred by domestic producers. *We appreciate the comments of Mostafa Beshkar, Piyush Chandra, Richard Chisik, Kaz Miyagiwa, and participants at the Midwest International Economics Group Meetings. Hartigan thanks LICOS of the Katholic University of Leuven in Belgium, where this paper was initiated, for its hospitality. He also thanks the National University of Singapore, where parts were written, for its hospitality.

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The Hidden Costs of International Dispute Settlement: WTO Review of Domestic Anti-Dumping Decisions

Cited by 11 publications

References 0 publications

Indisputably Essential: The Economics of Dispute Settlement Institutions in Trade Agreements

Indisputably Essential: The Economics of Dispute Settlement Institutions in Trade Agreements

Paved with good intentions: the dynamic effects of WTO review of anti-dumping action

Why Does the WTO Have an Antidumping Agreement?

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