The history of Fininvest/Mediaset’s media strategy: 30 years of politics, the market, technology and Italian society

Abstract

In this article we will analyse Fininvest/Mediaset's strategies in the media sector from its foundation to the present, considering four variables: politics, the market, technology and society. In particular, we will try to establish if, and to what extent, these four factors have affected and, in turn, have been affected by the company's strategies.Our interest in studying Mediaset stems from the pivotal role the company plays in the Italian television and media sector. Indeed, according to European Audiovisual Observatory sources (2006: 8), Mediaset is now the leading Italian media enterprise and ranks 17th in the world, registering a turnover of €3397 million. Its core business is commercial television but, as we will see, in recent years it has continued to branch out and expand. First, it focused on the internet, then on digital terrestrial TV and, finally, on mobile TV.The key role that Mediaset now plays in the communications industry has spurred us to investigate the history of the group from its origins for two reasons. First, to discover whether, and if so which of the company's current distinctive characteristics have distant origins. Second, to attempt to identify a guiding thread in Fininvest/Mediaset's strategies, accompanying its success and favouring its presence in the Italian media market for over 30 years.Even if a number of primary sources were used, the truly innovative element of this research is its multi-target approach. We have avoided focusing solely on one aspect of the group's history and, instead, have tried to set the entire history of Fininvest/Mediaset within a broader framework, encompassing political, economic, technological and social considerations (Richeri, 2006).

The web will kill them all: new media, digital utopia, and political struggle in the Italian 5-Star Movement

“…Since the development of TV in the 1950s and the foundation of RAI, public television channels have been dominated by political parties (Padovani, 2005). In recent years, the leading private TV network, Mediaset, has been owned or indirectly controlled by the former prime minister and media mogul Silvio Berlusconi (Mazzoleni, 2000;Hibberd, 2007;Balbi and Prario, 2010). Nor have the political biases of Italian television been counterweighted by press media: as Peppino…”

“…Since the development of TV in the 1950s and the foundation of RAI, public television channels have been dominated by political parties (Padovani, 2005). In recent years, the leading private TV network, Mediaset, has been owned or indirectly controlled by the former prime minister and media mogul Silvio Berlusconi (Balbi and Prario, 2010;Hibberd, 2007;Mazzoleni, 2000). Nor have the political biases of Italian television been counterweighted by press media: as Peppino Ortoleva (1998) points out, Italian newspapers have been traditionally owned by private companies or have been under the influence of particular private interests, functioning as an element of pressure on the government and politics and taking up the role that lobbies play in countries where lobbying is legal and regulated, such as the United States.…”

TV-centrism and politicisation in Italy: obstacles to new media development and pluralism

“…Indeed, in his double role of media mogul and prime minister, Berlusconi has for many years been able to control, directly and indirectly, both the commercial and the public broadcasters, and to influence the media policies that affect his TV businesses. As reported by Balbi and Prario (2010), since 1994, Mediaset 'found itself subject to legislation drafted and enacted by a political majority led by its main champion, and […] the private television industry began to lay down the law for the entire sector' (p. 393).…”

“…In addition, since 1994, when Berlusconi entered the political arena as the leader of the centre-right wing, 'the impact of duopoly on pluralism has become a major democratic concern' (D'Arma, 2010: 202). The many implications of Berlusconi's so-called 'conflict of interest' have been widely reported (Balbi and Prario, 2010;D'Arma, 2009D'Arma, , 2010Hibberd, 2007Hibberd, , 2008Padovani, 2007Padovani, , 2009Padovani, , 2010 and can be divided into two main patterns: the influence of politics over TV news coverage and the influence of the dominant broadcasters' interests over the political choices in the media policies domain. Indeed, in his double role of media mogul and prime minister, Berlusconi has for many years been able to control, directly and indirectly, both the commercial and the public broadcasters, and to influence the media policies that affect his TV businesses.…”

“…Because of Berlusconi's conflict of interest, the issues of media ownership regulation and competition in the broadcasting sector have become a ground for intense political confrontations between pre-established and partisan opinions rather than technical and unpoliticised debates. Consequently, the history of Italian television has always been characterised by a chronic political unwillingness to curb the established broadcasters' dominant positions and, more generally, to regulate the development of the media system in a way that favours pluralism, a situation that led to recurring political inaction, the procrastination of reforms and a delay in their implementation (Balbi and Prario, 2010;Mazzoleni, 2000;Padovani, 2010). The few media policies -for example, the Maccanico law (1997) and the Gasparri law (2004) -have generally been inadequate, belated and mainly oriented towards protecting 'the interests of broadcasting companies to consolidate and maintain their dominant positions' rather than solving the market concentration problems' (Padovani, 2009: 289).…”