The Hotelling-Downs Model with Runoff Voting

Brusco, Sandro; Dziubiński, Marcin; Roy, Jaideep

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1670806

Cited by 3 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…Proof. Consider the cyclic path of length 4 γ := (x (1) , x (2) , x (3) , x (4) , x (5) ) = ((2, 0), (1, 0), (1, 3), (2, 3), (2, 0)). This cyclic path is simple, i.e.…”

Section: Other Potentialsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Discrete hotelling pure location games: potentials and equilibria

Iimura

Mouche

2021

ESAIM: ProcS

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We study two-player one-dimensional discrete Hotelling pure location games assuming that demand f(d) as a function of distance d is constant or strictly decreasing. We show that this game admits a best-response potential. This result holds in particular for f(d) = wd with 0 < w ≤ 1. For this case special attention will be given to the structure of the equilibrium set and a conjecture about the increasingness of best-response correspondences will be made.

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“…Proof. Consider the cyclic path of length 4 γ := (x (1) , x (2) , x (3) , x (4) , x (5) ) = ((2, 0), (1, 0), (1, 3), (2, 3), (2, 0)). This cyclic path is simple, i.e.…”

Section: Other Potentialsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…(1). Using the bi-matrix (2), we obtain (u 1 (x (2) ) − u 1 (x (1) )) + (u 2 (x (3) ) − u 2 (x (2) )) + (u 1 (x (4) ) − u 1 (x (3) )) + (u 2 (x (5) ) − u 2 (x (4) ))…”

Section: Other Potentialsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Discrete hotelling pure location games: potentials and equilibria

Iimura

Mouche

2021

ESAIM: ProcS

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“…Xefteris (2016) shows that when one allows each voter to cast k ≥ 2 votes, instead of just k = 1 , then equilibrium exists for a non-degenerate class of distributions when at least k + 1 candidates enter at every location. Under runoff voting, Brusco et al (2012) show that when N > 2 , equilibria (typically many) exist. In contrast, I offer results in a static setting with a plurality voting system (common to many countries, e.g., the United States, Canada, India and the United Kingdom) while allowing endogenous entry by an unlimited number of potential strategic candidates, i.e., N = ∞.…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Extreme idealism and equilibrium in the Hotelling–Downs model of political competition

Ronayne

2018

Public Choice

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In the classic Hotelling-Downs model of political competition, no pure strategy equilibrium with three or more strategic candidates exists when the distribution of voters' preferred policies is unimodal. I study the effect of introducing two idealist candidates to the model who are non-strategic (i.e., fixed to their policy platforms), while allowing for an unlimited number of strategic candidates. Doing so, I show that equilibrium is restored for a non-degenerate set of unimodal distributions. In addition, the equilibria have the following features: (1) the left-most and right-most candidates (i.e., extremists) are idealists; (2) strategic candidates never share their policy platforms, which instead are spread out across the policy space; and (3) if more than one strategic candidate enters, the distribution of voter preferences must be asymmetric. I also show that equilibria can accommodate idealist fringes of candidates toward the extremes of the political spectrum.

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“…Instead of accentuating differences, "[c]entripetal [political systems] encourage a search for com-mon ground" (Gerring, Thacker, and Mereno 2005: 569). As detailed in the preceding section, a runoff rule favors candidates that adopt the ideological position of the median voter (Haan and Vokerink 2001;Brusco, Dziubiński, and Roy 2012); as such, a presidential runoff rule would be an example of a centripetal political system. Gerring, Thacker, and Moreno (2005: 569) argue that "[c]entripetal, rather than centrifugal, [political systems] create the conditions for good governance."…”

Section: The Downside Of a Large Distance Between The Ideological Position Of The President And The Median Votermentioning

confidence: 99%

Human rights in presidential democracies : does a runoff rule reduce repression?

Holzer¹

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I argue that within a democratic context the presence of a presidential runoff rule leads to the following outcomes: a reduced distance between the ideological position of the president and the median voter, a reduced percent of the cabinet in the same party as the president, and a reduced likelihood that the president is elected without a majority. Additionally, I argue that a large distance between the ideological position of the president and the median voter, cabinets comprised of a high percent of members in the same party as the president, and presidents elected without a majority are all negatively associated with high government respect for human rights. Since the presence of a runoff rule reduces determinants that are in turn negatively associated with high government respect for human rights, the presence of a runoff rule is likely positively associated with high government respect for human rights. Ultimately, I find that democratic presidential elections held using a runoff rule produce presidents that are less likely to be associated with lower government respect for human rights, and more likely to be associated with greater government respect for human rights. In order to promote government respect for human rights, I suggest that constitutional designers embrace the idea of instituting a presidential runoff rule. Simply put: a relatively easy way to reduce repression is to add the possibility of a runoff round to all democratic presidential elections.

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The Hotelling-Downs Model with Runoff Voting

Cited by 3 publications

References 15 publications

Discrete hotelling pure location games: potentials and equilibria

Discrete hotelling pure location games: potentials and equilibria

Extreme idealism and equilibrium in the Hotelling–Downs model of political competition

Human rights in presidential democracies : does a runoff rule reduce repression?

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