The Identity Theory of Powers Revised

Abstract

Dispositionality and qualitativity are key notions to describe the world that we inhabit. Dispositionality is a matter of what a thing is disposed to do in certain circumstances. Qualitativity is a matter of how a thing is like. According to the Identity Theory of powers, every fundamental property is at once dispositional and qualitative, or a powerful quality. Canonically, the Identity Theory holds a contentious identity claim between a property’s dispositionality and its qualitativity. In the literature, this view faces a contradiction objection that undermines its merits. We should therefore consider an alternative version that does not embrace the identity claim. My aim is to show that we can enjoy the benefits of the Identity Theory without embracing the identity between the dispositional and the qualitative. I shall argue that a distinction between two senses of dispositionality and qualitativity serves the purpose. I will then discuss three readings of the identity claim that can be formulated in light of such a distinction. I will conclude that even if the identity were to fail in any of the suggested readings, it would be possible to hold an account of fundamental powerful qualities.

Powers and the hard problem of consciousness: conceivability, possibility and powers

“…The terminology in current use for this family of entities is varied and thereby apt to cause confusion, with some philosophers talking about causal powers while others prefer 'potentialities', 'dispositions' or 'dispositional properties' (with the 1 There are many proponents of powers, or dispositionalism about properties. See, for instance, Shoemaker (1980), Mumford (1998), Martin and Heil (1999), Heil (2003), Molnar (2003), Martin (2007), Bird (2007), Borghini and Williams (2008), Strawson (2008), Marmadoro (2010), Mumford and Anjum (2011a), (2011b, Jacobs (2011), Schroer (2013), Taylor (2013), Tugby (2013), Vetter (2015), Carruth (2016), Azzano (2019), and Giannotti (2019). As noted above, I do not mean to imply that all these theorists would endorse the physicalism discussed in this paper.…”

“…These families of theories interact with the conceivability argument in distinctive, although not mutually exclusive, ways but each is consistent with the view that philosophical zombies are not 2possible; thus, they are consistent with some form of physicalism and the physicalist 8 There are now many proposals for pure powers theories, including Shoemaker (1980), Mumford (1998), Molnar (2003), Bird (2007), Borghini andWilliams (2008), Marmadoro (2010), Mumford andAnjum (2011a, b, 2018), Vetter (2015) to name just a few. Powerful qualities theories are proposed by Heil (2003), Jacobs (2011), Schroer (2013, Taylor (2013), Carruth (2016), Giannotti (2019), among others. I will not explain these views in detail in this paper, nor will I note the differences between them except where these might be relevant to how the theory interacts with the conceivability argument.…”

“…Fortunately, the matter is somewhat tangential to the arguments of this paper since it suffices for my purposes that powerful qualities theories interact with the conceivability argument in the same way as Russellian Monist theories, and this will be true of any theory in which the qualitativity of a property is necessarily bound to, or is identical with, what it can do. 11 The most popular account is the identity thesis which regards qualities as identical to powers (Martin & Heil, 1999, p .47;Heil, 2003, p. 111;Heil, 2012;Martin, 2007;Strawson, 2008;Jacobs, 2011;Taylor, 2013;Carruth, 2016;Coates, 2020), but one might also regard qualitativity and powerfulness to be aspects of properties (Giannotti, 2019, who also examines different ways of understanding the identity claim), consider properties to be compounds of qualitativity and powerfulness (Taylor, 2018), or postulate another relation between the two. (The differences between these options need not delay us here.)…”

Disentangling Dispositions from Powers

“…presents an account on which properties give us the truthmakers to describe them as qualities and as powers. Finally,Gianotti (2021) andWilliams (2019) both present accounts on which the powerful and qualitative are aspects of properties.8 SeeTaylor (2018) for an argument to the effect that there is no real difference between a pure powers view and at least certain accounts of powers as powerful qualities.9 While I am dismissing Platonism about properties as an option for the powers-realist, Platonism has had its defenders in the powers-realist camp (e.g.,Tugby, 2013).10 For more on this sort of view of powers in causal processes, seeBuckareff (2017),Chakravartty (2005),Heil (2012), Marmodoro (2017,Molnar (2003), andMumford and Anjum (2011). For a slightly different take on powers in causation on which the activity of powers is part of a story of substances as causes, seeIngthorsson (2021),Kuykendall (2019), andWhittle (2016).…”

“…Jacobs (2011) presents an account on which properties give us the truthmakers to describe them as qualities and as powers. Finally, Gianotti (2021) and Williams (2019) both present accounts on which the powerful and qualitative are aspects of properties.…”