the ideology of heads of government, 1870–2012

Brambor, Thomas; Lindvall, Johannes

doi:10.1057/s41304-017-0124-9

Cited by 39 publications

(30 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…To generate partisan-turnover variables, we used information from the Database of Political Institutions complemented by the Heads of Government data set by Brambor and Lindvall (2012), based and Upper 2013) and we use a 4-year window to be conservative. Mian et al (2014) define post-crisis spells as "up to five years after a financial crisis event."…”

Section: Data Description and Methodologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Correlates of Crisis Induced Credit Market Discipline: The Roles of Democracy, Veto Players, and Government Turnover

Amri

Willett

Richey

et al. 2020

Preprint

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Do countries learn from their mistakes? Here we consider one example of this question with respect to banking crises using the concept of effective learning, that is learning plus the ability to implement such learning. Excessive credit growth is widely considered to be the most important contributor to banking crises. Thus, it is interesting to see whether banking crises are associated with lower rates of credit growth in the future and if so, what are major factors which influence such changes in behavior. In previous research we have found that on average banking crises are followed by substantially lower rates of credit growth but this varies considerably across countries. Our hypothesis is that lower rates of future credit growth reflect a process of learning from one's mistakes and taking corrective actions. This paper offers an investigation of some of the political economy factors that may influence whether crises result in greater discipline over future credit growth. Overall, we found very little average effective learning in stable autocracies and on the contrary, found considerable discipline in stable democracies; nevertheless, we found even larger discipline effects in countries that transitioned to democracy during and in the wake of a banking crisis. Our results regarding the role of veto players and government turnovers are inconclusive. 1 All of the authors are also associated with the Claremont Institute for Economic Policy Studies. We thank Mark Copelovitch, Andreas Kern, David Steinberg and Meredith Wilf for valuable comments and suggestions.

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Section: Data Description and Methodologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Correlates of Crisis Induced Credit Market Discipline: The Roles of Democracy, Veto Players, and Government Turnover

Amri

Willett

Richey

et al. 2020

Preprint

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“…The Varieties of Democracy dataset provides a measure of the relative power of different socioeconomic groups at the time of democratization, but based on this variable ( v2pepwrsoc ), there are no countries where, at the time of democratization, non-elites wielded considerable power. As an alternative, to measure differences in the degree to which the poor are represented in the new democracy, I estimate heterogeneous treatment effects of democracy by whether or not the new democratic government was left-wing or not, using data from the “Ideology of Heads of Government, 1870–2012” dataset by Brambor, Lindvall, and Stjernquist (2017). The results do not provide consistent evidence for the claim that there is a difference in the effect of democratization on primary SERs depending on whether or not the new democratic government is left-wing (Table A6).…”

Section: Disentangling the Average Null Effect Of Democracy: The Rolementioning

confidence: 99%

“… 13 Using data on the ideology of governments from Brambor, Lindvall, and Stjernquist (2017), Figure B4 provides suggestive visual evidence that transitioning from a non-leftist to a left-wing nondemocracy leads to an increase in primary school enrollment rates. …”

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confidence: 98%

“…Exploratory quantitative tests provide mixed evidence for the industrialization argument.Figure B2shows that central governments began to regulate primary schooling during pre-industrial times, whereasFigure B3suggests that industrialization increased after central governments began to regulate primary schooling.13 Using data on the ideology of governments fromBrambor, Lindvall, and Stjernquist (2017),Figure B4provides suggestive visual evidence that transitioning from a non-leftist to a left-wing nondemocracy leads to an increase in primary school enrollment rates.14Figure B5provides suggestive visual evidence that the expansion of primary schooling under non-democracies was not merely a historical coincidence. These regimes appear to have incentives of their own to expand primary schooling, as suggested by the observation that reversals from democracy to non-democracy are, on average, followed by an acceleration of primary school enrollment rates that is not observed in countries that remain democratic.…”

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confidence: 99%

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The Non-Democratic Roots of Mass Education: Evidence from 200 Years

Paglayan

2020

Am Polit Sci Rev

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Because primary education is often conceptualized as a pro-poor redistributive policy, a common argument is that democratization increases its provision. But primary education can also serve the goals of autocrats, including redistribution, promoting loyalty, nation-building, and/or industrialization. To examine the relationship between democratization and education provision empirically, I leverage new datasets covering 109 countries and 200 years. Difference-in-differences and interrupted time series estimates find that, on average, democratization had no or little impact on primary school enrollment rates. When unpacking this average null result, I find that, consistent with median voter theories, democratization can lead to an expansion of primary schooling, but the key condition under which it does—when a majority lacked access to primary schooling before democratization—rarely holds. Around the world, state-controlled primary schooling emerged a century before democratization, and in three-fourths of countries that democratized, a majority already had access to primary education before democratization.

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“…A third approach focuses on particular political strategies and policy reforms given different class configurations (see e.g. Brambor and Lindvall 2014; Capoccia 2005; Gourevitch 1986; Luebbert 1987).…”

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confidence: 99%

Economic Crisis, Bureaucratic Quality and Democratic Breakdown

Andersen¹,

Krishnarajan²

2018

Gov. & oppos.

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Why do economic crises sometimes lead to democratic breakdown and sometimes not? To answer this question, we bring in a new conditioning factor. We propose that bureaucracies of higher quality – implying more competent, efficient and autonomous employees – to a greater extent shield the masses from impoverishment and unjust distribution of resources. This dampens anti-regime mass mobilization, which decreases elite incentives and opportunities for toppling the democratic regime. Statistical analyses of democracies globally from 1903 to 2010 corroborate that the impact of economic crises on the risk of democratic breakdown is suppressed when democracies have a bureaucracy of higher quality. The results are robust to alternative model specifications, including a battery of ‘good governance’ indicators. The effect of bureaucratic quality is not driven by bureaucracies’ ability to hinder crisis onset or shorten crisis duration but rather their ability to decrease domestic upheavals during crises.

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the ideology of heads of government, 1870–2012

Cited by 39 publications

References 11 publications

Correlates of Crisis Induced Credit Market Discipline: The Roles of Democracy, Veto Players, and Government Turnover

Correlates of Crisis Induced Credit Market Discipline: The Roles of Democracy, Veto Players, and Government Turnover

The Non-Democratic Roots of Mass Education: Evidence from 200 Years

Economic Crisis, Bureaucratic Quality and Democratic Breakdown

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