2017
DOI: 10.1057/cep.2015.5
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The imbalance of capitalisms in the Eurozone: Can the north and south of Europe converge?

Abstract: The European response to the sovereign debt crisis has exposed a tension between the national and the supranational in a multilevel polity while opening up new political cleavages between the north and south of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). This dilemma has become particularly acute for programme countries that were either directly or indirectly in receipt of non-market financial fundingfrom the troika. Drawing upon a new international political economy approach to comparative political economy, this … Show more

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Cited by 68 publications
(52 citation statements)
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References 37 publications
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“…On the other side, some CCC scholars find their prime source of inspiration not in ( post-)VoC, but in the (institutionalist) Regulation perspective, Dependency theory and post-Kaleckian macroeconomics. Still they come to similar conclusions about the fragile interdependence between nationally distinct capitalisms within the EMU (Stockhammer, 2011(Stockhammer, , 2013Armingeon and Baccaro, 2012;Becker and Jäger, 2013;Regan, 2013Regan, , 2015Becker, 2014b;Gambarotto and Solari, 2015;Jessop, 2014;Stockhammer et al, 2014;Baccaro and Benassi, 2015;Baccaro and Pontusson, 2015;Johnston and Regan, 2015;Suau Arinci et al, 2015). Here, however, the focus is not only on supply-side institutions (and companies), but also on demand-side institutions such as collective bargaining and unemployment insurance (and household indebtedness), and these scholars often do not speak of CMEs, but of export-led or profit-led growth regimes (or models), in contrast to the demand-/ consumption-/debt-/wage-led growth regimes that typically can be found in LMEs and MMEs.…”
Section: Three Generations Of CC Researchmentioning
confidence: 80%
“…On the other side, some CCC scholars find their prime source of inspiration not in ( post-)VoC, but in the (institutionalist) Regulation perspective, Dependency theory and post-Kaleckian macroeconomics. Still they come to similar conclusions about the fragile interdependence between nationally distinct capitalisms within the EMU (Stockhammer, 2011(Stockhammer, , 2013Armingeon and Baccaro, 2012;Becker and Jäger, 2013;Regan, 2013Regan, , 2015Becker, 2014b;Gambarotto and Solari, 2015;Jessop, 2014;Stockhammer et al, 2014;Baccaro and Benassi, 2015;Baccaro and Pontusson, 2015;Johnston and Regan, 2015;Suau Arinci et al, 2015). Here, however, the focus is not only on supply-side institutions (and companies), but also on demand-side institutions such as collective bargaining and unemployment insurance (and household indebtedness), and these scholars often do not speak of CMEs, but of export-led or profit-led growth regimes (or models), in contrast to the demand-/ consumption-/debt-/wage-led growth regimes that typically can be found in LMEs and MMEs.…”
Section: Three Generations Of CC Researchmentioning
confidence: 80%
“…In fact, after the German reunification Germany applied an internal devaluation that helped to boost its exports and from 2009 to now have remained stable with not significant increases in salaries. Regan (2015) argues that the existence of important differences between countries following an export-led model, like Germany, and others like Spain, Portugal or Greece following a demand-led model. To understand the differences in these two models are a prerequisite to develop and appropriate economic policy response (Storm & Naastepad, 2015).…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Central to this was a coordinated internal devaluation, led by unions and employers in the manufacturing sector, and which was specifically aimed at reducing unit labor costs, whilst retaining core employment (Hassel 2014). This beggar-thy-neighbor strategy of wage repression led to rising inequalities and contributed to the current account surplus of Germany, feeding imbalances within the Eurozone, and broadly informs the EU's labour market response to crisis today (see Blyth 2013;Hall 2012;Streeck 2014;Storm 2014;Regan 2015;Nölke 2016;Stockhammer 2016;Schmidt 2016 for a critique).…”
Section: The Political Economy Of An Fdi-led Growth Model In Europementioning
confidence: 99%