The immigration issue and anti-immigrant party success in Sweden 1970-2006

Abstract

Electoral success of anti-immigrant parties varies considerably across Western Europe. This article contributes to research on this important matter by analysing which current theories that accounts for the failure of anti-immigrant parties in one national context, Sweden. It draws on an unusually rich set of data to trace important processes from the 1970s up to 2006. It shows that the failure of anti-immigrant parties is not explained by low citizen demand for anti-immigrant policies. The article does however find clear support for party strategy theories. More specifically, in accordance with important strands of this literature, it is found that a dismissive issue strategy has been effective in reducing support for anti-immigrant parties. There is also support for the expectation that established parties to the right are more inclined to pursue anti-immigrant policies than parties to the left.

Voices from the far right: a text analysis of Swedish parliamentary debates

“…The early non-success of the SD cannot, however, be explained by low citizen demand for anti-immigrant policies in Sweden (Dahlström & Esaiasson 2013, Rydgren 2002, and on top of that, the party was more successful in the 2000s than in the 1990s, despite the fact that anti-immigration attitudes were more prevalent in the Swedish electorate in the 1990s (Erlingsson et al 2012). Furthermore, we cannot point to constitutional or institutional change having altered the political opportunity structure of the SD (cf.…”

“…The disengagement has also been expressed as a solid cordon sanitaire -a blocking coalition between most or all of the mainstream parties, Downs (2001) -and as a demonization of the SD (Heinze 2018, Dahlström & Esaiasson 2013, Loxbo 2014, Saveljeff 2011.…”

“…The dismissive issue strategy dominated the behavior of Swedish mainstream parties until 2010, a fact which seems to have reduced the support for the SD (Dahlström & Esaiasson 2013, Heinze 2018. The electoral rise of the SD, however, brought about an adversarial strategy among the mainstream parties, including parties on the right side of the political spectrum.…”

“…The other two mainstream parties, the Social Democrats and the Left Party, were not part of the agreement, but neither did they oppose it. Furthermore, when those two parties formed a left-green minority government in 2014, they began their term by declaring that the content of that same agreement would also serve as the basis for their government policy (Loxbo (2014), Dahlström & Esaiasson (2013), (Dahlström & Sundell 2012, p. 362). A couple of months later the same left-green government was close to collapse when they failed to pass their budget through parliament (Jungar 2015, p. 197).…”

“…From a comparative perspective, the SD's success is profound; in spite of its compromising organizational background and its origins in the Swedish extreme right and white power movement (Rydgren 2002, Widfeldt 2014, the party has managed to adapt to and consolidate its position in the Swedish parliament, while also strengthening its position among the Swedish electorate in an unparalleled way (Widfeldt 2014), and it is now the third largest party in the Swedish parliament. The mainstream parties have responded to this by exclusion and what Downs (2001) calls "disengaging strategy", which has been expressed in many different ways, all aimed at politically isolating the SD: by ignoring and dismissing the party and its issues, by adopting policy positions as far as possible from the SD, by blocking coalitions (cordon sanitaire) and by demonizing the party and its representatives (Heinze 2018, Loxbo 2014, Saveljeff 2011, Dahlström & Esaiasson 2013). …”