The Impact of Adaptation on the Stability of International Environmental Agreements

Abstract

We examine the stability of international environmental agreements that include clauses pertaining to both adaptation and mitigation measures. We assume that adaptation requires a prior irreversible investment and presents the characteristics of a private good by reducing a country's vulnerability to the impact of pollution, while mitigation policies produce a public good by reducing the total amount of pollution. Using a stylized model, we show that adaptive measures can be used strategically and that their inclusion in environmental agreements enhances agreement stability and can even lead to full cooperation. We examine the robustness of agreements including both adaptation and mitigation measures against renegotiation. Finally, we evaluate how including adaptive measures for climate change in international environmental agreements affects welfare and overall pollution.

Impact of social externalities on the formation of an international environmental agreement: an exploratory analysis

“…We know that developed countries have a higher gross domestic product per capita and consequently are more susceptible to being damaged, but at the same time these countries have much larger financial and technological means than developing countries to adapt to climate change and lessen its impact. Our assumption is in line with the nascent literature considering not only mitigation when designing an IEA, but also adaptation efforts that aim at reducing the damage cost (see, for example, Benchekroun and Taherkhani, ; Breton and Sbragia, , ; Benchekroun et al., ; Lazkano et al., ; Masoudi and Zaccour, ).…”

An Adaptation-Mitigation Game: Does Adaptation Promote Participation in International Environmental Agreements?

“…Bayramoglu et al (2018) solve a mitigation-adaptation game and find that the participation in an emission agreement can be high when emissions are strategic complements. On the other hand, Breton and Sbragia (2019) solve an adaptation-mitigation game and find that the participation in an environmental agreement can be high provided that countries cooperate when they decide on their levels of adaptation. The authors analyze two types of agreements with cooperation in adaptation.…”

“…For this reason, we think that this is an issue that deserves more attention. In this paper, we analyze the impact that adaptation has on participation when countries decide first on their levels of adaptation as in Breton and Sbragia's (2019) paper.This approach has been followed by others authors as Zehaie (2009), Masoudi and Zaccour (2017), Breton and Sbragia (2017) for analyzing different issues. In these papers, it is assumed that countries take a decision on adaptation in anticipation of mitigation policies that imply a commitment on adaptation before deciding on mitigation.…”

Accounting for adaptation and its effectiveness in International Environmental Agreements

“…This crop of papers is mostly based on empirical Integrated Assessment Models with only few proposing theoretical framework (Zehaie 2009;Welsch 2011 andIngham et al 2013;Eisenack and Kahler 2016). Even fewer have analyzed how the presence of adaptation could affect the size and stability of an IEA (Benchekroun et al 2011;Buob and Siegenthaler 2011;Marrouch and Chaudhuri 2011;Auerswald et al 2018;Bayramoglu et al 2018;Breton and Sbragia 2019).…”