2000
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.222788
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The Impact of CEO Turnover on Firm Volatility

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Cited by 11 publications
(20 citation statements)
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“…The variables liquidity and duration are not significantly different in both samples. Consistent with Clayton et al (2005), stock price volatility is considerably greater for the forced relative to voluntary turnover firms.…”
Section: Descriptive Statisticsmentioning
confidence: 59%
See 3 more Smart Citations
“…The variables liquidity and duration are not significantly different in both samples. Consistent with Clayton et al (2005), stock price volatility is considerably greater for the forced relative to voluntary turnover firms.…”
Section: Descriptive Statisticsmentioning
confidence: 59%
“…We utilize five databases in our analysis: Lehman Brothers Fixed Income database (LBFI), Huson et al (2001) database for those CEOs listed in the Forbes Annual Compensation Survey who have held their position for one year or less, Compustat database for financial and firm specific information, Center of Research in Security Prices database (CRSP) for stock pricing data, and Bloomberg financial database for recent bond pricing data that 3 Additionally, Huson et al (2004) find that firm size, measured by the book value of total assets, decreases following forced turnover, while Clayton et al (2005) report similar evidence following outsider replacement. 4 Mansi and Reeb (2002) provide evidence of a positive relation between corporate diversification and bondholder wealth (i.e., increased corporate diversification is associated with a lower cost of debt financing).…”
Section: Datamentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…To control for the effect of outside succession, I use two dummy variables, OUTF t (OUTNF t ) that equals one if the new CEO is an outsider and replaces a dismissed (a voluntarily departing) top executive in year t and zero otherwise. Similar to previous studies, I classify CEO successions as outside if the incoming CEO has been with the firm for a year or less at the time of the succession announcement (Parrino, 1997; Clayton et al, 2000; Khurana and Nohria, 2000; Huson et al, 2001; and Hayes et al, 2002). Detailed information on the career paths of the new CEOs is collected mainly from the Corporate Register and FT articles.…”
Section: Variables and Descriptive Statisticsmentioning
confidence: 99%