The impact of cross-shareholding under different power structures considering green investment and green marketing

Abstract

Cross-shareholding has played an important role in strengthening strategic synergy among enterprises, but its impact on the green development of enterprises is unclear. In this paper, we construct an analytical framework that includes a manufacturer and a retailer to explore the impact of cross-shareholdings under different leaderships on green supply chain operational decisions and profits, in which the manufacturer invests in green technologies and the retailer conducts green marketing. By constructing and solving the game model of manufacturer-led and retailer-led before and after cross-shareholding, it is found that after cross-shareholding, the product's green level and the retailers' marketing level are improved. For supply chain leaders, cross-shareholdings always increase their profits. Only when the follower holds the leader's shares no more than a certain value, cross-shareholding will increase the total profit of the supply chain. In addition, we obtain the optimal decisions and profits of the supply chain in the integrated situation and design two-part pricing contracts to achieve cross-shareholding supply chain coordination. The results of this paper can provide theoretical guidance and decision support for enterprises interested in using cross-shareholding to improve supply chain performance.