The impact of food safety regulatory information intervention on enterprises’ production violations in China: a randomized intervention experiment

Abstract

The prevalence of unsafe food poses a widespread challenge across numerous nations. Despite the continuous investments by the Chinese government in food safety regulation, the condition of food safety in China is still not ideal and requires substantial enhancements. Cost-effective, information-based strategies are essential for the effective management of food safety hazards. In this research, we established an extensive database of food enterprises with documented violations and carried out a randomized intervention trial to assess the effects of regulatory information interventions on the decrease of production violations in these enterprises. The findings reveal that interventions based on food safety regulatory information were instrumental in diminishing production violations among food enterprises and had spillover effects within a given geographic area. It is important to note that the impact of the intervention was delayed, with noticeable results on production violations becoming apparent 6 months post-intervention. Additionally, the degree of information communication and the degree of information concern can positively moderate the reduction of food enterprises’ production violation behavior by food safety regulatory information intervention.

Preference of Chinese food production enterprises to government regulatory Information——A choice experiment approach

“…Food manufacturers' perceptions of government oversight operations are not readily apparent, despite the Chinese government allocating greater regulatory resources to the security of food sampling [ 9 ]. Due to the strong distribution character of food, the efforts of the Chinese government to sample and inspect food are focused on the distribution chain, with sampling and inspection targeted at distributors [ 10 , 11 ]. Information about approved items is not shared with producers further upstream in the supply chain, despite the fact that the government's sample of problematic food manufacturing firms at distributors may be immediately linked to upstream producers [ 12 ].…”