“…Spending on patronage fuelled by the abundance of mineral rents may have a similar effect (Auty, 2005;Vandewalle, 1998). Mineral rents concentrated in the hands of authoritarian rulers may also suppress democratic aspirations either in the form of excessive spending in internal security (this is what Michael Ross (2001) coins the 'repression effect'; see also Sandbakken, 2006;Tsui, 2010 andGause, 1995) or obstruction of free information (Dutta and Roy, 2009;Egorov et al, 2009;Williams, 2011). The appropriability of the mineral rents by the rulers in power (which for example might increase when mineral industries are nationalised) naturally mediates the resource-democracy relationship (Ross, 2012;Snyder and Bhavnani, 2005).…”