The Impact of Napoleon

Abstract

This book examines Prussia's response to Napoleon and Napoleonic expansionism in the years before the crushing defeats of Auerstadt and Jena, a period of German history as untypical as it was dramatic. Between the years 1797 and 1806 the main fear of Prussian statesmen was French power, rather than revolution from below. This threat spawned a foreign-policy debate characterised by geopolitical thinking: the belief that Prussian policy was conditioned by her unique geographic situation at the heart of Europe. The book breaks new ground both methodologically and empirically. By combining high-political and geopolitical analysis, it is able to present a more comprehensive and nuanced picture than earlier interpretations. The book also draws on a very wide range of sources, official and unofficial, many previously unused.

Hermann von Boyen the Elder and his Impact on the Prussian Army After 1815

“…26 Brendan Simms described the Kabinett system that was introduced during the early years of Frederick William III's reign as a 'personal fortress'. 27 Indeed, 'there was no power in Prussia without royal access', 28 and political authority was diminished due to in-fighting between the king's favourites and advisors. One of the main aims of the reforming faction long before 1806 was 'to eliminate all limitations on monarchic "decisionism"', 29 and to introduce a new 'constitutional system' which was intended to be an effective structure of the executive and decision-making process, with the king at the centre of the political system.…”

“…27 Indeed, 'there was no power in Prussia without royal access', 28 and political authority was diminished due to in-fighting between the king's favourites and advisors. One of the main aims of the reforming faction long before 1806 was 'to eliminate all limitations on monarchic "decisionism"', 29 and to introduce a new 'constitutional system' which was intended to be an effective structure of the executive and decision-making process, with the king at the centre of the political system. 30 The Minister of War should, in this vision, be the king's closest and most important advisor.…”

“…One of the main aims of the reforming faction long before 1806 was 'to eliminate all limitations on monarchic "decisionism"', 29 and to introduce a new 'constitutional system' which was intended to be an effective structure of the executive and decision-making process, with the king at the centre of the political system. 30 The Minister of War should, in this vision, be the king's closest and most important advisor. Additionally, a professional department, which would be subordinate to the minister, should be created to manage the army in an institutional manner.…”

Prussian Reform: The Recovery of a Nation

“…16 With both political and physical weakness, the Prussian officer corps had become closely mirrored in the fighting ability of the their army. 17 With the failure of his noble and aristocratic commanders, the king was now more than willing to allow a reformation to take place within the army's sacred hierarchy. To remove the disgrace of having failed the country as well as to regain the confidence of the king, both the senior officer corps and the Commission reformers purged their most senior members, including 100 general officers.…”