The impact of proficiency testing information and error aversions on the weight given to fingerprint evidence

Mitchell, Gregory; Garrett, Brandon L.

doi:10.1002/bsl.2402

Cited by 27 publications

(32 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…Other studies observed the same effect observed here: people's risk preferences, or views on error rates, affect how they view evidence in criminal cases (Mitchell & Garrett, 2019). Although the criminal justice system adopts a heightened "beyond a reasonable doubt" burden of proof and thus treats false convictions as more serious than false acquittals, individuals may not share that normative view.…”

Section: Iva Risk Preferencessupporting

confidence: 69%

Factoring the Role of Eyewitness Evidence in the Courtroom

Garrett

Liu²,

Kafadar

et al. 2020

J Empirical Legal Studies

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A pressing concern with the eyewitness testimony used in many criminal cases is that jurors may be swayed by the high confidence of an eyewitness and, as a result, may disregard other factors that provide more diagnostic information. Mock jurors were surveyed using a large national sample of 1,684 laypeople, selected to be representative of the U.S. population (age, race, gender, geographic region), using mock trial videos of eyewitness testimony. To explore the relationship between courtroom confidence and other factors, we used a fractional factorial design, permitting examination of the relationships among seven factors. Among these seven factors, we found that jurors gave most weight to the confidence of eyewitnesses, especially that expressed in the courtroom, irrespective of the eyewitness's testimony about confidence (low or high) at the initial police lineup. Jurors' assessments were not sensitive to the other factors or their interactions in the experiment: crime type (burglary or sexual assault), the race of the defendant and eyewitness, or information provided in judicial instructions or by expert testimony. The disproportionate importance of the eyewitness's expressed confidence has implications for the effectiveness of legal efforts to inform jurors about factors affecting eyewitness memory.

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Section: Iva Risk Preferencessupporting

confidence: 69%

Factoring the Role of Eyewitness Evidence in the Courtroom

Garrett

Liu²,

Kafadar

et al. 2020

J Empirical Legal Studies

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“…These concerns primarily relate to genuinely held opinions that are plausible, but ultimately incorrect or insufficiently reliable. For example, low-quality opinions are those that are given without sufficient evidence that the underpinning science is repeatable, reproducible, or accurate (PCAST 2016); that is expressed incorrectly or without appropriate qualification (NRC 2009), where the proficiency of the examiner has not been demonstrated (Garrett and Mitchell 2018;Martire and Edmond 2016) and where biasing contextual information has not been appropriately disclosed or managed (Dror 2016;NRC 2009). Conversely, high(er)quality opinions are those based on foundationally valid methods and techniques, that are expressed using valid terminology, and that appropriately disclose assumptions and limitations (NRC 2009).…”

Section: Evidence Quality Evaluation In Forensic Contextsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Limited not lazy: a quasi-experimental secondary analysis of evidence quality evaluations by those who hold implausible beliefs

et al. 2020

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Past research suggests that an uncritical or ‘lazy’ style of evaluating evidence may play a role in the development and maintenance of implausible beliefs. We examine this possibility by using a quasi-experimental design to compare how low- and high-quality evidence is evaluated by those who do and do not endorse implausible claims. Seven studies conducted during 2019–2020 provided the data for this analysis (N = 746). Each of the seven primary studies presented participants with high- and/or low-quality evidence and measured implausible claim endorsement and evaluations of evidence persuasiveness (via credibility, value, and/or weight). A linear mixed-effect model was used to predict persuasiveness from the interaction between implausible claim endorsement and evidence quality. Our results showed that endorsers were significantly more persuaded by the evidence than non-endorsers, but both groups were significantly more persuaded by high-quality than low-quality evidence. The interaction between endorsement and evidence quality was not significant. These results suggest that the formation and maintenance of implausible beliefs by endorsers may result from less critical evidence evaluations rather than a failure to analyse. This is consistent with a limited rather than a lazy approach and suggests that interventions to develop analytical skill may be useful for minimising the effects of implausible claims.

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“…Compounding this problem, laypeople tend to believe that forensic science errors are exceptionally rare (38). Hence, jurors tend to trust forensic evidence (39,40), even if it was analyzed using an unvalidated technique (41) and even after being explicitly informed of its limitations (42).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Forensic Confirmation Bias: Do Jurors Discount Examiners Who Were Exposed to Task‐Irrelevant Information?*†

Kukucka

Hiley

Kassin

2020

Journal of Forensic Sciences

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Knowledge of task-irrelevant information influences judgments of forensic science evidence and thereby undermines their probative value (i.e., forensic confirmation bias). The current studies tested whether laypeople discount the opinion of a forensic examiner who had a priori knowledge of biasing information (i.e., a defendant's confession) that could have influenced his opinion. In three experiments, laypeople (N = 765) read and evaluated a trial summary which, for some, included testimony from a forensic examiner who was either unaware or aware of the defendant's confession, and either denied or admitted that it could have impacted his opinion. When the examiner admitted that the confession could have influenced his opinion, laypeople generally discounted his testimony, as evidenced by their verdicts and other ratings. However, when the examiner denied being vulnerable to bias, laypeople tended to believe him-and they weighted his testimony as strongly as that of the confession-unaware examiner. In short, laypeople generally failed to recognize the superiority of forensic science judgments made by context-blind examiners, and they instead trusted examiners who claimed to be impervious to bias. As such, our findings highlight the value of implementing context management procedures in forensic laboratories so as not to mislead fact-finders.

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The impact of proficiency testing information and error aversions on the weight given to fingerprint evidence

Cited by 27 publications

References 13 publications

Factoring the Role of Eyewitness Evidence in the Courtroom

Factoring the Role of Eyewitness Evidence in the Courtroom

Limited not lazy: a quasi-experimental secondary analysis of evidence quality evaluations by those who hold implausible beliefs

Forensic Confirmation Bias: Do Jurors Discount Examiners Who Were Exposed to Task‐Irrelevant Information?*†

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