The impact of retailers’ alliance on manufacturer’s profit in a dual-channel structure

Liu, Huihui; Sun, Shuguang; Ming, Lei; Deng, Honghui; Leong, G. Keong

doi:10.1080/00207543.2017.1330563

Cited by 23 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…Manufacturers cannot set flexible prices because of managerial inertia (MacCarthy et al, 2019) or brand image concerns (DellaVigna & Gentzkow, 2019). Liu et al (2017) develop a Cournot competition model in a dual‐channel SC and analyze the efforts of retailer alliances. When the direct sales cost is high, the possibility of retailer cooperation is lower; retailers form an alliance when the direct sales cost is sufficiently low.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Secondhand product quality disclosure strategy of the retailer under different supply chain structures

2022

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In a two‐stage supply chain comprising a manufacturer and a retailer selling secondhand products and new products, we incorporate the manufacturer's channel decisions to examine the retailer's quality disclosure strategy of secondhand products. The quality disclosure of secondhand products may or may not be implemented, but the direct channel is always introduced. Interestingly, the retailer withholds (discloses) information of secondhand products with sufficiently high quality when it is lower (higher) than consumers' acceptance of direct channel in dual‐channel structure. If the secondhand product quality is lower than consumers' direct channel acceptance, the quality is disclosed only when it is medium.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In addition, the marginal costs of production/operation for the manufacturer are constant and normalized to zero. When there is no transaction, both the retailer's and the customers' utilities are set to zero (Huang et al, 2018; Liu et al, 2017).…”

Section: Problem Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Secondhand product quality disclosure strategy of the retailer under different supply chain structures

2022

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“…The option was found to be not always profitable, especially for best-selling products. Liu et al [22] found that when the manufacturer operated a dual-channel, the retailers may form an alliance only if the cost of online channel was sufficiently low, and thus decreased the profit of the manufacturer. Arya and Mittendorf [1] studied the condition for a retailer to operate a dual-channel in the presence of consumer sales taxes.…”

Section: 2mentioning

confidence: 99%

Impacts of horizontal mergers on dual-channel supply chain

Zhao¹,

Niu²

2022

JIMO

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<p style='text-indent:20px;'>This paper investigates the impacts of horizontal mergers on a dual-channel supply chain given the rapid development of e-commerce. Three types of horizontal mergers are considered in a dual-channel supply chain consisting of three firm types: suppliers, single-channel retailer, and dual-channel retailer. A comparison with a benchmark pre-merger scenario underscores the impacts of each horizontal merger on firms in the dual-channel supply chain. First, where horizontal mergers occur (i.e., at upstream or downstream tier) has an impact on firms in the dual-channel supply chain. Second, synergy costs trigger the domination of the synergy effect. Third, the degree of consumer preference for channels affects the trigger due to which the synergy effect outweighs the competitive effect. Although dual channels prevail in supply chain management, few studies pay attention to horizontal mergers in this context. Unlike literature on horizontal mergers in single-channel supply chains, we suggest that the impacts of horizontal mergers in dual-channel supply chains have unique features, and channel preference plays an important role in such impacts.</p>

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“…Xu et al (2014) showed that if the manufacturer and retailer are risk-averse, the price will be lower than that in a risk-neutral dualchannel supply chain while the decentralized system is inefficient due to the vertical and horizontal competition. Liu et al (2017) developed a dual channel supply chain model with a manufacturer and several homogeneous retailers, and studied the impact of retailer's alliance on each player's profit in direct channel and retailer channel. They showed that forming an alliance is not always beneficial for retailers, and manufacturer's channel control capability largely affects the retailers' choices on alliance.…”

Section: Distribution Channel Integration and Vertical Merger Strategymentioning

confidence: 99%

Trade credit or vertical merger strategy for financial constrained retailer in a supply chain with asymmetric competing retailers

Zhan

et al. 2021

RAIRO-Oper. Res.

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Motivated by the practices that many small and middle-sized enterprises (SME) retailers have financial constraints due to their limited budget and financing access, this paper studies the manufacturer's financial strategy (i.e., trade credit versus vertical merger with a capital-constrained retailer) in a supply chain with two financial asymmetric retailers. We first compare the equilibrium profits under different financing modes and find that if manufacturer's capital cost under trade credit or administrative cost under vertical merger is below a certain threshold, the manufacturer should finance instead of deselect the capital-constrained retailer even though the competition is intensified. Furthermore, manufacturer can choose a financing strategy based on the tradeoff between financing value and cost from trade credit or vertical merger. Under trade credit, the increased horizontal competition intensity is against the capital-constrained retailer while with vertical merger the competition intensity is harmful to the capital-abundant retailer. In addition, through investigating the impact of different financial modes on the equilibrium profits of the supply chain players, we find that whether trade credit can outperform vertical merger for both the manufacturer and the capital-constrained retailer depends on horizontal competition intensity, profit-sharing proportion and administrative cost of vertical merger. Moreover, the capital-abundant retailer will get the lowest profit when other participators act like an alliance. Our study provides a roadmap for the manufacturer to make a financing policy for capital-constrained retailer who competes with a funded retailer.

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The impact of retailers’ alliance on manufacturer’s profit in a dual-channel structure

Cited by 23 publications

References 33 publications

Secondhand product quality disclosure strategy of the retailer under different supply chain structures

Secondhand product quality disclosure strategy of the retailer under different supply chain structures

Impacts of horizontal mergers on dual-channel supply chain

Trade credit or vertical merger strategy for financial constrained retailer in a supply chain with asymmetric competing retailers

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