“…Although the magnitude of shareholder dissent is generally low and there have been limited number of cases where voting has altered the outcome (Iliev, Lins, Miller, & Roth, 2015), the variations in dissent provide insights into the effectiveness of shareholder empowerment and disapproval expressed in shareholder dissent could be followed by value-creating actions (Fischer, Gramlich, Miller, & White, 2009). There is evidence on the role of voting in director elections (Jiang, Wan, & Zhao, 2016), mergers and acquisitions (Tokbolat et al, 2019), and executive remuneration (Joura, Xiao, & Ullah, 2021). Yet, despite widespread regulatory reforms and shareholders' pressure on firms to de-diversify ii , to the best of our knowledge, there has been no empirical evidence on shareholder empowerment, and particularly voting, in the context of corporate diversification and divestment.…”