2021
DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2020.101606
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The impact of Say-on-Pay votes on firms' strategic policies: Insights from the Anglo-Saxon economy

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Cited by 4 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…On the other hand, the business operation will face fierce competition and uncertainty of the environment, senior managers may take risk aversion to technological innovation on behalf of their interests (Guan & Zhang, 2020; Xi & Zhang, 2021). According to agency theory, the most important game is the asymmetry of information (Joura et al, 2021). The management may start from their own selfish perspective, and choose non-corporate value maximization (Van Dun et al, 2017).…”
Section: Literature Review and Research Hypothesismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…On the other hand, the business operation will face fierce competition and uncertainty of the environment, senior managers may take risk aversion to technological innovation on behalf of their interests (Guan & Zhang, 2020; Xi & Zhang, 2021). According to agency theory, the most important game is the asymmetry of information (Joura et al, 2021). The management may start from their own selfish perspective, and choose non-corporate value maximization (Van Dun et al, 2017).…”
Section: Literature Review and Research Hypothesismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…According to the agency theory, coordination and communication problems can occur when a firm's board has a large number of directors. Larger boards have more disagreements, are less focused, and thereby can be less effective and vigilant in monitoring CEOs (Salama & Putnam, 2013;Joura et al, 2021). Bebchuk et al (2002) suggest that CEOs have more power when boards are larger, which makes it more difficult for directors to organize in opposition to managers.…”
Section: Board Sizementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Although the magnitude of shareholder dissent is generally low and there have been limited number of cases where voting has altered the outcome (Iliev, Lins, Miller, & Roth, 2015), the variations in dissent provide insights into the effectiveness of shareholder empowerment and disapproval expressed in shareholder dissent could be followed by value-creating actions (Fischer, Gramlich, Miller, & White, 2009). There is evidence on the role of voting in director elections (Jiang, Wan, & Zhao, 2016), mergers and acquisitions (Tokbolat et al, 2019), and executive remuneration (Joura, Xiao, & Ullah, 2021). Yet, despite widespread regulatory reforms and shareholders' pressure on firms to de-diversify ii , to the best of our knowledge, there has been no empirical evidence on shareholder empowerment, and particularly voting, in the context of corporate diversification and divestment.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%