The impact of vendor customizations on android security

Abstract

The smartphone market has grown explosively in recent years, as more and more consumers are attracted to the sensor-studded multipurpose devices. Android is particularly ascendant; as an open platform, smartphone manufacturers are free to extend and modify it, allowing them to differentiate themselves from their competitors. However, vendor customizations will inherently impact overall Android security and such impact is still largely unknown.In this paper, we analyze ten representative stock Android images from five popular smartphone vendors (with two models from each vendor). Our goal is to assess the extent of security issues that may be introduced from vendor customizations and further determine how the situation is evolving over time. In particular, we take a three-stage process: First, given a smartphone's stock image, we perform provenance analysis to classify each app in the image into three categories: apps originating from the AOSP, apps customized or written by the vendor, and third-party apps that are simply bundled into the stock image. Such provenance analysis allows for proper attribution of detected security issues in the examined Android images. Second, we analyze permission usages of pre-loaded apps to identify overprivileged ones that unnecessarily request more Android permissions than they actually use. Finally, in vulnerability analysis, we detect buggy pre-loaded apps that can be exploited to mount permission re-delegation attacks or leak private information.Our evaluation results are worrisome: vendor customizations are significant on stock Android devices and on the whole responsible for the bulk of the security problems we detected in each device. Specifically, our results show that on average 85.78% of all preloaded apps in examined stock images are overprivileged with a majority of them directly from vendor customizations. In addition, 64.71% to 85.00% of vulnerabilities we detected in examined images from every vendor (except for Sony) arose from vendor customizations. In general, this pattern held over time -newer smartphones, we found, are not necessarily more secure than older ones.

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