The impacts of new governance on teaching at German universities. Findings from a national survey

Abstract

In this article we will present findings from a national survey questioning the actual impact of the new governance structures at German universities on academic teaching. To begin with, we give a theoretical underpinning to the economization of higher education institutions (HEIs) according to Principal-Agent Theory. This allows for the development of hypotheses about the influence of new selective incentives (merit pay, performance-related budgeting, Management by Objectives, teaching awards) on the professors' academic teaching behavior. Instructed by critical considerations on PrincipalAgent Theory we extended the axiomatics of this economic theory by incorporating concepts like work task motivation and academic socialization for a supposedly more comprehensive explanation. Data from a nationwide German survey allows us then to test our theory-driven assumptions. Our target population was the entire collectivity of all professors at German universities from which we could draft a sample 8,000 individuals. An estimation of four different OLS-regression models shows that the hypotheses derived from Principal-Agent Theory must be rejected whereas the hypotheses based on motivational aspects and socialization processes can be confirmed. Based on our analysis we can conclude that for the status quo of implementation there are no direct influences of new selective incentives on the actual teaching performance whereas we have strong indications for altered mechanisms of enculturation in the field of universities. New Public Management (NPM) seems to produce a new breed of professors whose preferences and practice are conditioned by the imperatives evoked by this new managerialism.

Current Developments at Higher Education Institutions and Interview-Based Recommendations to Foster Work Motivation and Work Performance

“…Second, Holyoke et al ( 2012 ) reported in their survey of American faculty members a trend to hire non-tenured faculty, which has the effect of greater turnover among these scholars, for example, when budgets are cut and because of transient work force norms that may lower job commitment. Third, Wilkesmann and Schmid ( 2012 ) reported survey results concerning the infl uence that New Public Management had on academic teaching in Germany. Based on a sample of professors from different disciplines, the authors observed no direct infl uences of the new incentives (e.g., merit pay, performance-related budgeting, Management by Objectives, teaching awards) on teaching performance.…”

What affects the teaching style of German professors? Evidence from two nationwide surveys

“…The risk of shirking one's responsibilities is particularly high in the context of teaching as there is little hierarchical monitoring of the professorate's behavior. Therefore, selective incentives could perhaps be helpful to address laziness in academic teaching (Wilkesmann and Schmid 2012). From the vantage point of Principal-Agent Theory, incentive structures are best-suited to overcome aspects of opportunism, which are particularly problematic in organizational settings such as professional bureaucracies (Mintzberg 1989).…”

“…As a result, the leader of the university must strengthen the incentive to perform well in teaching, a core task that is often perceived as the least valuable in a university career. In Germany, four primary selective incentives have already been implemented to overcome these problems: (1) merit pay, (2) performance-related budgeting, (3) Management by Objectives (MbO) and (4) teaching awards (Wilkesmann and Schmid 2012).…”

Bullying in Higher Education in Taiwan: The Taiwan Higher Education Faculty Survey (THEFS)

“…Suzuki (1989), Readings (1996) and Ritzer (1996) were among the early scholars pointing at the potential risks of commercializing higher education and conceptualized such a process as the "prostitution of academia," which would lead to "fast food academic chain stores." More recent studies, such as Wilkesmann and Schmid (2012), show that New Public Management has produced a new breed of educators who are conditioned by entrepreneurial logic. There is concern among liberal scholars that this new corporate academic culture may endanger the traditional role of higher education in liberal democracies, which is to educate society for active and critical citizenship (Giroux, 2002).…”