The Impacts of the Eu Ets on Norwegian Plants’ Environmental and Economic Performance

Klemetsen, Marit E.; Rosendahl, Knut Einar; Jakobsen, Anja Lund

doi:10.1142/s2010007820500062

Cited by 49 publications

(38 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…This may be explained by allowance allocation in Phase II being much tighter for Lithuanian firms than in Phase I. Klemetsen et al (2016) estimate the impact of the EU ETS on CO 2 emissions and CO 2 intensity, as well as on value added and labour productivity (value added per man hour) of Norwegian-regulated manufacturing plants. The DiD approach is applied to a plant-level panel dataset obtained by combining different datasets, the most important of which is compiled by the Norwegian Environment Agency.…”

Section: Cross-sector Country-specific Effects 15mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Impact of the Eu Emissions Trading System on Competitiveness and Carbon Leakage: The Econometric Evidence

Verde

2020

Journal of Economic Surveys

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This paper carefully surveys the econometric literature that tests for competitiveness effects and related carbon leakage caused by the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). The results of this literature tell us that to date there is no evidence of the EU ETS having had widespread negative or positive effects on the competitiveness of regulated firms, nor is there evidence of significant carbon leakage. However, the paper also identifies three important caveats to this general conclusion. Firstly, the evidence we have still largely refers to the first two trading periods, namely Phases I (2005–2007) and II (2008–2012). Secondly, some heterogeneity of estimated effects is observed, but patterns, notably sectoral patterns, hardly emerge. Thirdly, very little explored is whether the EU ETS has had long‐term effects on the economy via investment leakage or firm dynamics. Further empirical studies investigating these long‐term effects are particularly desirable.

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Section: Cross-sector Country-specific Effects 15mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Impact of the Eu Emissions Trading System on Competitiveness and Carbon Leakage: The Econometric Evidence

Verde

2020

Journal of Economic Surveys

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“…38. See Wagner, Muûls, Martin, and Colmer (2014) for France; Petrick and Wagner (2014) for Germany and Klemetsen, Rosendahl, and Jakobsen (2016) for Norway. 39.…”

Section: Lessons Learned and Further Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Carbon taxes and greenhouse gas emissions trading systems: what have we learned?

Haites

2018

Climate Policy

254

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Systematic evidence relating to the performance of carbon pricingcarbon taxes and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading systems (ETSs)is sparse. In 2015, 17 ETSs were operational in 55 jurisdictions while 18 jurisdictions collected a carbon tax. The papers in this special thematic section review the performance of many of these instruments over the 2005-2015 period. The performance of existing carbon taxes and GHG ETSs can help policy makers make informed choices about whether to introduce these instruments and to improve their design. The purpose of carbon pricing instruments is to reduce GHG emissions cost effectively. Assessing their performance is difficult because emissions are also affected by other policies and exogenous factors such as economic conditions. Carbon taxes in Europe prior to 2008 and in British Columbia reduced emissions from business-as-usual but actual emissions continued to rise. Since 2008 emissions subject to European carbon taxes have declined, but in most countries, other mitigation policies have probably contributed more to the reductions than the carbon taxes. Emissions subject to ETSs, with the exception of four systems without emissions caps, have declined. The ETSs contributed to the emissions reductions, but their share of the overall reduction is not known. Most tax rates are low relative to levels thought to be needed to achieve climate change objectives. Few jurisdictions regularly adjust their tax rates. All ETSs have accumulated surplus allowances and implemented measures to reduce these surpluses. The largest ETSs now specify annual reductions in their emissions cap several years into the future. Emissions trading system allowance prices are generally lower than the tax rates.Key policy insights . Theoretical discussions usually portray carbon taxes and GHG ETSs as alternatives.In practice, a jurisdiction often implements both instruments to address emissions by different sources. . Designs of ETSs have evolved based on experience shared bilaterally and via dedicated institutions. . Carbon tax designs, in contrast, have hardly evolved and there are no institutions dedicated to sharing experience. . Every jurisdiction with an ETS and/or carbon tax also has other policies that affect its GHG emissions. ARTICLE HISTORYCarbon pricing can be implemented using either of two instrumentsa carbon tax or a GHG emissions trading system (ETS). With a tax, the government sets the tax rate and specifies the sources subject to the tax. The emission reduction achieved depends upon the response of the affected sources to the imposition of the tax. With an ETS the government sets a limit on GHG emissions by specified sources and distributes allowances approximately equal to the limit. 2 Allowances are tradable. Each source must surrender allowances equal to its actual emissions to the government. Emissions cannot exceed the limit, but the compliance cost depends on the market price of allowances.There is an extensive literature on the relative merits of these two instruments (e.g. Partnersh...

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“…Applying this theorem to the EU ETS means that we should expect the same distribution of abatement choices independently from the allocation mechanism applied. However, this 'independence property' might not hold in a real-world trading scheme, because of transaction costs (Stavins, 1995[40]), imperfect competition (Hahn, 1984[41]), and behavioural anomalies such as an endowment effect (Kahneman, D., J. Knetsch and R. Thaler, 1990 [42]).…”

Section: Allocation Of Free Emission Allowancesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The joint impact of the European Union emissions trading system on carbon emissions and economic performance

Dechezleprêtre¹,

Nachtigall²

2018

OECD Economics Department Working Papers

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This document, as well as any data and map included herein, are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area. 2 │ ECO/WKP(2018)63 THE JOINT IMPACT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEM ON CARBON EMISSIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE Unclassified OECD Working Papers should not be reported as representing the official views of the OECD or of its member countries. The opinions expressed and arguments employed are those of the author(s). Working Papers describe preliminary results or research in progress by the author(s) and are published to stimulate discussion on a broad range of issues on which the OECD works.

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The Impacts of the Eu Ets on Norwegian Plants’ Environmental and Economic Performance

Cited by 49 publications

References 33 publications

The Impact of the Eu Emissions Trading System on Competitiveness and Carbon Leakage: The Econometric Evidence

The Impact of the Eu Emissions Trading System on Competitiveness and Carbon Leakage: The Econometric Evidence

Carbon taxes and greenhouse gas emissions trading systems: what have we learned?

The joint impact of the European Union emissions trading system on carbon emissions and economic performance

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