The impacts of the “right to know”: Information disclosure and the violation of drinking water standards

Bennear, Lori S.; Olmstead, Sheila M.

doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2008.03.002

Cited by 172 publications

(72 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…When required to disclose toxic pollution, some chemical companies took steps to reduce such pollution before the public and press responded ( 12). Studies of the required disclosure of drinking water contaminants reveal preemptive responses by water-quality agencies ( 13).…”

Section: Three Emerging Questionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Targeting Transparency

Weil

Graham

Fung

2013

Science

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Section: Three Emerging Questionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Targeting Transparency

Weil

Graham

Fung

2013

Science

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“…In Canada, mandatory reporting to the National Pollutant Releases Inventory (NPRI) has been shown to reduce chemical pollution levels among those who perceive a stronger threat of regulation and to a much less extent among those who perceive significant consumer pressure (Antweiler and Harrison 2003; Harrison and Antweiler 2003). A stronger role of information via the consumer channel is observed when there is a direct consumer information provision program as shown by Bennear and Olmstead (2008) who find that water utilities reduce their violations of Safe Drinking Water Act standards if they are mandated to report water contaminant levels to consumers. In the climate change arena where the specific form of regulation is forthcoming but still uncertain, voluntary information disclosure programs are growing but existing studies demonstrate evidence of greenwashing behavior among participants in a number of voluntary programs such as the U.S. DOE 1605, U.S. DOE/EPA Climate Challenge, and the Canadian Voluntary Climate and Challenge Registry (Brouhle and Harrington 2010; Kim and Lyon 2011; Welch, Mazur, and Bretschneider 2000).…”

Section: Background Framework and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Effectiveness of State Pollution Prevention Programs and Policies

Harrington

2012

Contemporary Economic Policy

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States are using regulatory‐, information‐, and management‐based policies to encourage the adoption of pollution prevention (P2) and reduce pollution. Using a sample of facilities of S&P 500 firms which report to the Toxic Releases Inventory from 1991 to 2001, this study employs dynamic panel data models to examine the effectiveness of state legislations and policies in increasing P2 and reducing toxic releases. I find that toxic waste legislations are effective in reducing toxic releases and in promoting P2, but the effect of policy instruments differ. Facilities in states with reporting requirement and mandatory planning adopt more P2 even in states that do not emphasize toxic waste reduction. The effectiveness of reporting is stronger among facilities with good environmental performance, while the potency of mandatory planning is greater among facilities with past P2 experience. In contrast, numerical goals reduce toxic pollution levels only among those which have been subjected to high levels of enforcement action. These suggest that reporting requirement and mandatory planning may be promoting the P2 practices which can improve public image and which benefit from enhanced technical know‐how, but they are not causing meaningful pollution reductions, implying that the existing policies must be complemented by other approaches to achieve higher reductions in toxic pollution levels. (JEL Q55, O38, H23)

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“…However, Bui (2005) found that the declines in emissions after TRI reporting events may have been attributable to regulation rather than investor pressure. Bennear and Olmstead (2006) found that drinking water quality notices lowered violations for some systems, but not others.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Information Disclosure Policies: Evidence From the Electricity Industry

Delmas¹,

Montes-Sancho²,

Shimshack

2010

Economic Inquiry

109

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A "third wave" of environmental policy has recently emerged that emphasizes information provision as an integral part of the risk mitigation strategy. While theory suggests that information programs may correct market failures and improve welfare, the empirical effectiveness of these programs remains largely undetermined. We show that mandatory information disclosure programs in the electricity industry achieve stated policy goals. We find that the average proportion of fossil fuels decreases and the average proportion of clean fuels increases in response to disclosure programs. However, the programs also produce unintended consequences. Customer composition and pre-existing fuel mix significantly affect program response, suggesting that effective information disclosure policies may not be efficient.

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The impacts of the “right to know”: Information disclosure and the violation of drinking water standards

Cited by 172 publications

References 35 publications

Targeting Transparency

Targeting Transparency

Effectiveness of State Pollution Prevention Programs and Policies

Information Disclosure Policies: Evidence From the Electricity Industry

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