The importance of testing Smart Grid IEDs against security vulnerabilities

Weerathunga, Pubudu Eroshan; Cioraca, Anca

doi:10.1109/cpre.2016.7914920

Cited by 10 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…The measurements are mapped back to the MMXU logical device in the IEC 61850 server. Figure 10 shows a typical communication between the DNP3 client and DNP3 serve for a "select-before operate" (Hunt and Popescu 2015), (Weerathunga and Cioraca 2016) communication flow. In the select-before-operate, two commands are sent in sequence.…”

Section: Details On Interoperability Codementioning

confidence: 99%

Enabling Interoperable SCADA Communications for PV Inverters through Embedded Controllers

Vaidhynathan

Prabakar

Singh

et al. 2021

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Section: Details On Interoperability Codementioning

confidence: 99%

Enabling Interoperable SCADA Communications for PV Inverters through Embedded Controllers

Vaidhynathan

Prabakar

Singh

et al. 2021

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“…Port banning occurs when the accessed port provides information on the protocol running on the port, the device's operating system and application, etc. Port scanning helps the attacker in obtaining valuable information of the network, including IP address, list of open ports and the applications running on those ports [88][89][90][91][92].…”

Section: Transport (Layer 4)mentioning

confidence: 99%

A Survey of Protocol-Level Challenges and Solutions for Distributed Energy Resource Cyber-Physical Security

et al. 2018

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The increasing proliferation of distributed energy resources (DERs) on the smart grid has made distributed solar and wind two key contributors to the expanding attack surface of the network; however, there is a lack of proper understanding and enforcement of DER communications security requirements. With vendors employing proprietary methods to mitigate hosts of attacks, the literature currently lacks a clear organization of the protocol-level vulnerabilities, attacks, and solutions mapped to each layer of the logical model such as the OSI stack. To bridge this gap and pave the way for future research by the authors in determining key DER security requirements, this paper conducts a comprehensive review of the key vulnerabilities, attacks, and potential solutions for solar and wind DERs at the protocol level. In doing so, this paper serves as a starting point for utilities, vendors, aggregators, and other industry stakeholders to develop a clear understanding of the DER security challenges and solutions, which are key precursors to comprehending security requirements.

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“…There have been technical discussions about hypothetical impact scenarios by enumerating the combinations of potential catastrophe through unauthorized remote connection [9]. This includes the preliminary investigation on the specific protective relaying scheme, bus differential configuration, and what would be the impact if the IED is compromised [10], [11]. There still remains a challenge about how to effectively enumerate all hypothesized scenarios of cyber-induced attacks that can help defenders to identify pivotal combinations [9]- [12].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cyber-Induced Risk Modeling for Microprocessor-Based Relays in Substations

Yang

Ten

2018

2018 IEEE Innovative Smart Grid Technologies - Asia (ISGT Asia)

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Once critical substations are compromised, attack agents can coordinate among their peers to plot for maximizing disruption using local control devices. For defenders, it is critical to enumerate and identify all digital relays to determine the systemic risks. Any combination of disruptive switching via the compromised relays can result in misoperation or immediate effect to the system. The resulting consequence of these attack's initial events would possibly incur cascading failure to a grid. This paper quantifies the criticality of substation protective relays with the combination of the outage level and its corresponding severity risk index. The proposed hypothesized outages are based on the type of protective relaying, bus configuration of a substation, and commonly implemented relaying schemes, such as bus differential, directional overcurrent and distance relays, are studied. This preliminary work also provides three approaches of determination in probabilities for sensitivity analysis. The proposed risk indices are evaluated using IEEE test systems.

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The importance of testing Smart Grid IEDs against security vulnerabilities

Cited by 10 publications

References 0 publications

Enabling Interoperable SCADA Communications for PV Inverters through Embedded Controllers

Enabling Interoperable SCADA Communications for PV Inverters through Embedded Controllers

A Survey of Protocol-Level Challenges and Solutions for Distributed Energy Resource Cyber-Physical Security

Cyber-Induced Risk Modeling for Microprocessor-Based Relays in Substations

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