The Importance of the Proportionality Condition to the Doctrine of Double Effect: A Response to Fischer, Ravizza, and Copp

Woodward, Philip

doi:10.1111/j.1467-9833.1997.tb00382.x

Journal of Social Philosophy

1997

DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9833.1997.tb00382.x

|View full text |Cite

The Importance of the Proportionality Condition to the Doctrine of Double Effect: A Response to Fischer, Ravizza, and Copp

Philip Woodward¹

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...

Citation Types

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Year Published

1999

2022

Publication Types

Select...

Article5

Relationship

Self Cite0

Independent5

Authors

Journals

Cited by 5 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“… In so doing, we also diverge from Woodward (), who defends Quinn from the Lewis case by arguing, with Quinn, that the action is a case of harmful direct agency, but who distinguishes the case from the optical illusion variant offered by Fischer, Ravizza, and Copp (similar to Returning Population —see previous note) which he takes to be a case of harmful indirect agency. …”

mentioning

confidence: 77%

“… Others have noted that Fischer, Ravizza, and Copp's counterexamples can be rejected by noting that they build in less costly alternatives on the part of agents. Woodward () takes DDE to be a principle giving a set of necessary conditions of permissible action that builds in a proportionality constraint. In defending Quinn, Woodward argues that for this reason, none of the Bomb Remover cases would be permissible on DDE (1997, 145).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Three Cheers for Double Effect

Nelkin

Rickless

2012

Philos Phenomenol Research

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The doctrine of double effect, together with other moral principles that appeal to the intentions of moral agents, has come under attack from many directions in recent years, as have a variety of rationales that have been given in favor of it. In this paper, our aim is to develop, defend, and provide a new theoretical rationale for a secular version of the doctrine. Following Quinn (1989), we distinguish between Harmful Direct Agency and Harmful Indirect Agency. We propose the following version of the doctrine: that in cases in which harm must come to some in order to achieve a good (and is the least costly of possible harms necessary), the agent foresees the harm, and all other things are equal, a stronger case is needed to justify Harmful Direct Agency than to justify Harmful Indirect Agency. We distinguish between two Kantian rationales that might be given for the doctrine, a "dependent right" rationale, defended by Quinn, and an "independent right" rationale, which we defend. We argue that the doctrine and the "independent right" rationale for it are not vulnerable to counterexamples or counterproposals, and conclude by drawing implications for the larger debate over whether agents' intentions are in any way relevant to permissibility and obligation. 1 This paper resulted from discussions that grew out of a graduate seminar on non-consequentialist ethics that we co-taught at UCSD in 2010. We would like to thank the following seminar attendees for their helpful comments and probing questions: Craig Agule, Amy Berg, Nanhee Byrnes, Alex Marcellesi, Veronica Pear, and our colleague, Dick Arneson. We presented a shorter version of an ancestor of this paper at a stimulating workshop on doing harm at Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne in July 2011. We are very grateful to the members of the Equipe NoSoPhi who organized and participated in the workshop: Laurent Jaffro, Catherine Larrère, and Vanessa Nurock. We benefited greatly from the constructive comments and helpful suggestions we received from David Brink, William Fitzpatrick, Matthew Hanser, Derk Pereboom, and an anonymous referee for this journal. Thanks to you all. Finally, we would like to acknowledge our greatest debt, the one we owe our teacher, mentor, and friend, Warren Quinn, whose work and intellect we so admire, and who will never know just how grateful we are for his support and encouragement at a critical time in our lives.

show abstract

mentioning

confidence: 77%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Three Cheers for Double Effect

Nelkin

Rickless

2012

Philos Phenomenol Research

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Quinn's view has been criticized by, among others, Kamm (), Fischer, Ravizza and Copp (), McMahan (), and Scanlon (). For defenses of (or responses to objections to) Quinn's view (or views very similar to Quinn's), see Woodward (), Smith (), and Nelkin and Rickless (forthcoming). For an alternative principle similar in many ways to DDE that replaces the intensional concept of intention with the extensional concept of accomplishment, see Pruss ().…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

So Close, Yet So Far: Why Solutions to the Closeness Problem for the Doctrine of Double Effect Fall Short

Nelkin

Rickless

2013

Nous

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

According to the classical Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE), there is a morally significant difference between intending harm and merely foreseeing harm. Versions of DDE have been defended in a variety of creative ways, but there is one difficulty, the so-called "closeness problem", that continues to bedevil all of them. The problem is that an agent's intention can always be identified in such a fine-grained way as to eliminate an intention to harm from almost any situation, including those that have been taken to be paradigmatic instances in which DDE applies to intended harm. In this paper, we consider and reject a number of recent attempts to solve the closeness problem. We argue that the failure of these proposals strongly suggests that the closeness problem is intractable, and that the distinction between intending harm and merely foreseeing harm is not morally significant. Further, we argue that there may be a deeper reason why such attempts must fail: the rationale that makes the best fit with DDE, namely, an imperative not to aim at evil, is itself irredeemably flawed. While we believe that these observations should lead us to abandon further attempts to solve the closeness problem for DDE, we also conclude by showing how a related principle that is supported by a distinct rationale and avoids facing the closeness problem altogether nevertheless shares with DDE its most important features, including an intuitive explanation of a number of cases and a commitment to the relevance of intentions.

show abstract

“…For, these thinkers argue, in terror bombing an agent intends non-combatant deaths as a means while in tactical bombing an agent foresees but does not intend non-combatant deaths Ð neither as a means nor as an end. Thus, double-effect reasoning partially reposes on a distinction between consequentially similar states of affairs being intended as a means or foreseen as a concomitant but not intended [3]. This is the intended/foreseen distinction.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Double Effect and the End‐Not‐Means Principle: A Response to Bennett

Cavanaugh

1999

J Applied Philosophy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Proponents of double-effect reasoning Ð relying in part on a distinction between intention and foresight Ð assert that it is worse intentionally to cause harm than to cause harm with foresight but without intention. They hold, for example, that terror bombing is worse than tactical bombing in so far as terror bombing is the intentional harming of non-combatants while tactical bombing is not. In articulating the ethical relevance of the intended/foreseen distinction, advocates of double effect employ the Kantian end-not-means principle.Jonathan Bennett has recently argued that this principle cannot ground the ethical relevance of the intended/foreseen distinction. He holds that the principle demands that one benefit others while double effect deals with acts that do not benefit others. Thus, he maintains, the intended/foreseen distinction does not have ethical import and double effect is not tenable.I argue for a reading of the end-not-means principle that grounds the ethical relevance of both the intended/foreseen distinction and double effect.Deontologists, absolutists, and proponents of common morality often rely on doubleeffect reasoning Ð also referred to as the`principle',`rule', or`doctrine' of double effect Ð to contrast, amongst other actions, terror and tactical bombing [1]. Advocates of double effect think that, other things being equal Ð such as the number and probability of non-combatant deaths Ð tactical bombing is more easily justi®ed than terror bombing [2]. For, these thinkers argue, in terror bombing an agent intends non-combatant deaths as a means while in tactical bombing an agent foresees but does not intend non-combatant deaths Ð neither as a means nor as an end. Thus, double-effect reasoning partially reposes on a distinction between consequentially similar states of affairs being intended as a means or foreseen as a concomitant but not intended [3]. This is the intended/foreseen distinction. In what follows, I defend the ethical relevance of this distinction against a charge recently levelled by Jonathan Bennett [4]. I. Bennett's ObjectionIn articulating the ethical relevance of the intended/foreseen distinction proponents of double effect often rely on the Kantian intuition that it is wrong to treat another human being, an end-in-itself, merely as a means to furthering some other end Ð the end-notmeans principle [5]. According to many who rely on double effect, tactical bombing is more easily justi®ed than terror bombing because tactical bombing does not treat noncombatants as mere means to the realisation of an end while terror bombing does.

show abstract

scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.

Contact Info

customersupport@researchsolutions.com

10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614

Henderson, NV 89052, USA

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.

Blog Terms and Conditions API Terms Privacy Policy Contact Cookie Preferences Do Not Sell or Share My Personal Information

Made with 💙 for researchers

Part of the Research Solutions Family.

The Importance of the Proportionality Condition to the Doctrine of Double Effect: A Response to Fischer, Ravizza, and Copp

Cited by 5 publications

References 0 publications

Three Cheers for Double Effect

Three Cheers for Double Effect

So Close, Yet So Far: Why Solutions to the Closeness Problem for the Doctrine of Double Effect Fall Short

Double Effect and the End‐Not‐Means Principle: A Response to Bennett

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About