2005
DOI: 10.1007/s10516-004-4584-5
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The Impossibility of Relations Between Non-Collocated Spatial Objects And Non-Identical Topological Spaces

Abstract: I argue that relations between non-collocated spatial entities, between non-identical topological spaces, and between non-identical basic building blocks of space, do not exist. If any spatially located entities are not at the same spatial location, or if any topological spaces or basic building blocks of space are nonidentical, I will argue that there are no relations between or among them. The arguments I present are arguments that I have not seen in the literature.Axiomathes (2005) 15: 85-141 Ó Springer 2005 Show more

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Cited by 1 publication
(4 citation statements)
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“…17 As I discuss elsewhere in this article, it is not entirely clear why a particle arrangement is not able to give rise to a composite entity: why isn't a topological network a mereological whole? Only if it can be shown, as I did elsewhere (Grupp 2005b(Grupp , 2006a, that reality cannot involve any relations of arrangement is there no possibility of a composite entity, thus vindicating mereological nihilism as the correct theory. 123 example, even though quantum philosophical atoms can only be indistinguishable in quantum mereological nihilism, in this article I however can do little more than discuss indistinguishable atoms as if they are distinct, such as when I write, for example, ''atom A 1 and atom A 2 do not coincide.''…”
Section: The Only Quantum Particles That Exist Are Philosophical Atomsmentioning
confidence: 90%
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“…17 As I discuss elsewhere in this article, it is not entirely clear why a particle arrangement is not able to give rise to a composite entity: why isn't a topological network a mereological whole? Only if it can be shown, as I did elsewhere (Grupp 2005b(Grupp , 2006a, that reality cannot involve any relations of arrangement is there no possibility of a composite entity, thus vindicating mereological nihilism as the correct theory. 123 example, even though quantum philosophical atoms can only be indistinguishable in quantum mereological nihilism, in this article I however can do little more than discuss indistinguishable atoms as if they are distinct, such as when I write, for example, ''atom A 1 and atom A 2 do not coincide.''…”
Section: The Only Quantum Particles That Exist Are Philosophical Atomsmentioning
confidence: 90%
“…What I do have in mind, rather, is that atoms are locationless because space does not exist, and it doesn't because it is an item that (allegedly) has parts. In Grupp (2005b) I showed that space does not exist. I come to the same conclusion in this article but with very different arguments.…”
Section: Empirical Versus Quantummentioning
confidence: 99%
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