The impotence of power: Morgenthau's critique of American intervention in Vietnam

Abstract

While a superb scholarship on Morgenthau as a political theorist has literally exploded over the past ten years, his analysis of foreign policy has been generally neglected, overlooking the intimate relationship between theory and policy in his practical philosophy. This article presents Morgenthau's public opposition to the Vietnam War by placing it in the broader framework of his theoretical work. In doing so, I illustrate and clarify the meaning of three theses that are at the very centre of his political reflection: the critique to any type of universalistic understanding of world politics; his claim about the intangible roots and social bases of political order; and, finally, the dangers of the ‘military displacement of politics’. Writing about Morgenthau's critique of American intervention in Vietnam today is neither a purely academic exercise, nor a mere historical reconstruction of a great scholar's position on one of the most important military conflicts of the twentieth century. In fact, this article aims to shed light on some intellectual categories which seem to be useful in order to understand current political phenomena, and to criticise philosophies and faulty modes of thought that still enjoy a predominant but unjustified political status.

The realist science of politics: the art of understanding political practice

“…Morgenthau and Kennan, for example, took outspoken positions in their opposition to the U.S. involvement in Vietnam which divided Realists (e.g. Hixson, 1988; Klusmeyer, 2011; See, 2001; Zambernardi, 2011). Morgenthau, a famous critic, based his criticism on his invocation of the national interest which was “first and foremost concerned with values; that is those things and ideas in which human beings invest moral value” (Bain, 2000: 461; see also Morgenthau, 1960).…”

Maquiavelos «senza virtù»: a propósito de las realidades del realismo político

“…La segunda es que no cualquier acción que un Estado realice en relación a otro 10 El ejemplo más claro para Morgenthau (1965) fue la guerra de Vietnam, en la que la administración estadounidense quiso ir más allá de su competencia, invocando los derechos humanos para involucrar a su ejército en una guerra que poco tenía que ver, a su juicio, con el interés nacional concebido en términos racionales (vid. Zambernardi, 2011).…”

Realism and reflexivity: Morgenthau, academic freedom and dissent

“… 2. This article is concerned with the theoretical bases of Morgenthau’s articulation of a right and duty of an academic to dissent. I am not writing an historical account of Morgenthau’s opposition to Vietnam – a topic that has been covered in several admirable studies already (See 2001; Rafshoon, 2001; Zambernardi, 2011). Zimmer (2011) provides the most comprehensive historical account of Morgenthau’s importance to the anti-war movement. …”

“… 10. The extent to which Morgenthau was the subject of a sustained campaign designed to discredit him is unknown (and perhaps unknowable). One fairly senior figure in the administration, Zbigniew Brzezinski, denied any knowledge of a particular ‘Project Morgenthau’ and called its existence into question, but admitted ‘that there were probably efforts to undermine Morgenthau’s argumentation with the Administration’ (Zambernardi, 2011: 1353). Ellen Glaser Rafshoon (2001: 69) has uncovered evidence that the prominent Johnson administration staffer Fred Panzer wrote to Walt Rostow of the need to ‘defang’ Morgenthau’s criticism of US foreign policy in Asia. …”