The incentive mechanism and decision-making behavior in the green building supply market: A tripartite evolutionary game analysis

Liu, Yu; Zuo, Jian; Pan, Min; Ge, Qi; Chang, Ruidong; Xiong, Feng; Fu, Yanting; Dong, Na

doi:10.1016/j.buildenv.2022.108903

Cited by 70 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 45 publications

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“…Lu et al developed a bilateral evolutionary game model that involved government, developers, and consumers to study the decision-making mechanisms of stakeholders in the green building market [49]. Liu et al constructed a tripartite evolutionary game model including government, suppliers, and developers, to explore stakeholders' incentives and decision behaviors in the green building supply market [50].…”

Section: Research Methods For Energy-efficient Retrofittingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of Stakeholder Decision-Making Behavior in Energy-Efficient Retrofitting of Office Buildings

Xie

Liu

2022

Sustainability

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Environmental degradation is significantly influenced by the construction industry. Energy-efficient retrofitting of existing office buildings has become an effective means of reducing building energy consumption. Implementation of retrofits requires the support and cooperation of stakeholders. However, existing studies on the dynamics of decision-making behavior among stakeholders are still relatively limited. This study constructed a tripartite evolutionary game model including the government, property owners, and end users, to better understand the behavioral evolution and evolutionary stabilization strategies of stakeholders. The results show that: stakeholders’ decision-making behavior has obvious mutual influence; benefits and costs are the dominant factors in stakeholders’ decision making; the effects of government supervision policies depend on the profitability of the project; and government behavior appears to be influenced by public willingness. In addition, targeted countermeasures were proposed for the development of the energy-efficiency retrofit market. This study provides a generic model that fits various contexts and can be used to inform a reference for scientific decision making by stakeholders.

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Section: Research Methods For Energy-efficient Retrofittingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of Stakeholder Decision-Making Behavior in Energy-Efficient Retrofitting of Office Buildings

Xie

Liu

2022

Sustainability

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“…The game between Enterprise 1, Enterprise 2, and the government can be represented by a differential equation composed of

, and

. Through the local stability of the Jacobian matrix, the stable strategy of the system evolution is obtained [ 73 ], where

is expressed as:

…”

Section: Construction and Analysis Of Evolutionary Game Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Carbon Emission Reduction between Government and Enterprises under Carbon Quota Trading Policy

Chen

Liu

2022

IJERPH

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As one of the most efficient means of emission reduction policies, carbon quota trading has a far-reaching impact on the carbon emission reduction of enterprises. Firstly, a two-party evolutionary game model of enterprise and government and a three-party evolutionary game model of enterprise–enterprise–government are constructed based on the multi-agent driving mechanism, evolutionary game theory, scenario simulation, and other methods. Then, we conduct a series of policy simulations for carbon emission under different scenario models and various enforcement strengths. Lastly, the behavioral strategies and system evolution trajectories in enterprises and government carbon trading are comprehensively investigated. The results show that in the two-party and three-party evolutionary game models, the carbon trading behavior is affected by the joint action of the enterprise and the government. The difference in initial willingness mainly affects the speed of the subject’s convergence to the steady state. Based on this, policy suggestions are proposed, such as reducing the cost of carbon emission of enterprises, enhancing the vitality of carbon emission reduction of enterprises, and stimulating the power of government regulation and responsibility performance, which can provide suggestions for the development of the carbon market.

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“…In order to more clearly and intuitively show the influence of key factors on the evolution state and results of multi-party games and verify the effectiveness of evolutionary stability analysis, the following will further use MATLAB to simulate the evolution trajectory of each game. Under the condition of E 1 5(1,1,1) stability strategy, according to the dynamic replication equation and constraint conditions, combined with literature review and realistic situation (Liu et al, 2022), the following parameters are initially assigned: C G 5 0.1, S C 5 0.5, S O 5 0.4, P C 5 0.2, P O 5 0, C C1 5 0.4, C C2 5 0.25, C O1 5 0.2, C O2 5 0.1, U C1 5 0.5, U C2 5 0.4, U O1 5 0.3, U O2 5 0.15, U 1 5 1.6, U 2 5 0.5 and U 3 5 0.45. Figure 1 shows the initial results obtained.…”

Section: Simulation Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

The evolutionary game and simulation of key players in the green supply chain of construction industry

Zhang

Lu²

2022

MSCRA

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PurposeThis research studies the behavior choice of key actors in the construction supply chain and constructs a model which includes the benefit function of the government, contractors and owners, aiming at improving the coverage of green buildings.Design/methodology/approachIn this paper, tripartite dynamic game is studied and simulated based on duplicate dynamic equation. The tripartite game under government intervention is rarely considered, and government punishment measures are seldom introduced into the research.FindingsAccording to the simulation results, the practical insights in line with the development of green supply chain are put forward. Rewards and punishments affect the development of the supply chain. New technologies and new materials accelerate the development of green supply chain and then improve the coverage of green buildings.Research limitations/implicationsThis paper constructs a dynamic model based on complete information rationality, which is difficult to realize in practice, for information is incomplete and human rationality is limited.Originality/valueIn fact, the government has not issued a punishment document to introduce a new variable adjustment model.

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The incentive mechanism and decision-making behavior in the green building supply market: A tripartite evolutionary game analysis

Cited by 70 publications

References 45 publications

Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of Stakeholder Decision-Making Behavior in Energy-Efficient Retrofitting of Office Buildings

Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of Stakeholder Decision-Making Behavior in Energy-Efficient Retrofitting of Office Buildings

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Carbon Emission Reduction between Government and Enterprises under Carbon Quota Trading Policy

The evolutionary game and simulation of key players in the green supply chain of construction industry

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