The Incidental Fortress: The Single European Market and World Trade

Abstract

two anonymous referees for their comments on various earlier versions. All remaining shortcomings are my own. AbstractThe European Union's role in international trade contains two signifi cant con tra dictions: fi rst, although its trade policy, with some notable exceptions, is generally fair ly liberal, it has been the respondent in a number of high-profi le trade disputes; second, al though a champion of multilateralism, the EU has had problems com ply ing with World Trade Organization (WTO) judgments. I argue that these contradictions in the EU's trading persona are due to the internal dy nam ics of European policy-mak ing, which create 'regulatory peaks' where the member governments' rules diverge, and render the resulting rules dif fi cult to alter.

Political mobilization, veto players, and WTO litigation: explaining European Union responses in trade disputes

“…For some, EU compliance problems are prominent when the consent of the European Parliament is required to process domestic policy change (Daugbjerg and Swinbank 2008). Others argue that internal decision rules of EU policymaking favour the emergence of regulatory peaks when harmonized product regulations are required and make these very resistant to change, explaining when and why clashes between EU and WTO rules occur (Young 2004). While these institutionalist arguments point the way to overcoming the above-mentioned problems, they treat dispute escalation as solely determined by defendants' inability to comply.…”

Explaining the Genesis of a Trade Dispute: the European Union’s Seal Trade Ban

“…According to Young (2004), the EU's role in international trade is characterized by two contradictions. First, while being fairly liberal on average, it has been the respondent in a number of high-profile trade disputes.…”

Revisiting Structural Variables of Trade Negotiations: The Case of the Canada-EU Agreement

“…To be sure, EU member states are not completely left aside, and EU trade bargaining can still be qualified as a "three-level game" (Frennhoff Larsen 2007). Regulatory standards that have been painfully negotiated among member states within the EU could hardly be altered in the context of a bilateral trade negotiation with a third party (Young 2004).…”