The indelible role of the interpretive researcher's fore‐structure in traversing the hermeneutic circle

Abstract

Phenomenological researchers are obliged to grasp the epistemological and ontological differences between the Husserlian and Heideggerian branches of phenomenology to avoid misappropriating phenomenological terms or mischaracterizing study design. To that end, we spell out the key differences between both phenomenological traditions as background for describing the indelible role that the researcher's background assumptions, or fore‐structure, play in interpretive studies. We draw on our four studies to illustrate how we traversed the hermeneutic circle to disclose, challenge, and refine the personal, cultural, clinical, and scientific assumptions hidden in our fore‐structures. Our reflections highlight how understanding evolves, not by bracketing or disengaging ourselves from the phenomena we study, but by engaging in an open dialog that seeks understanding as lived by patients and families.