The Independence Case in Comparative Perspective

Abstract

Scotland is not the only sub‐state unit in Europe where relevant political actors make claims for independence. To generate insights on these independence demands, we compare the drivers, arguments and popular support for secession in Scotland, the Basque Country, Catalonia and Flanders. We argue that national identity, party politics and the economy are behind the independence requests, and the exact articulation of these elements varies from case to case. Currently, the most salient of these demands are the ones from Catalonia; Basque demands for self‐determination are less prominent than in the past, whereas the demand for a vote on independence is much less articulated in Flanders. Although the Scottish independence referendum has set a precedent for solving independence disputes, we argue that the possibilities of exporting the Scottish referendum experience to other realities are limited.

Evidence-based designation of development regions in Romania

“…Therefore, our study addresses the question of area designation for development purposes combining the above-mentioned perspectives. This line of questioning and argumentation concurs with the major findings of the study of Lineira and Cetra (2015), where economy and national identity -alongside party politicsare considered the main factors behind regionalisation in Europe.…”

Does international recognition matter? Support for unilateral secession in Catalonia and Scotland

“…In accordance with previous research on the relationship between national identity and support for independence (Liñeira & Cetrà, ), we expect respondents with strong nationalist preferences (either pro‐secession or pro‐host state) to maintain their positions after our primings, even when they were faced with an adverse context of increasing costs. A “hard version of independence” scenario that supported the statist views of Spanish or British nationalists (e.g., no international support for secession) would thus reaffirm their preferences, and this adverse treatment would be ignored as the prospects of international recognition would not alter their preferences towards the status quo.…”

“…Middle‐ground voters with moderate nationalist beliefs (and shared identities) were significantly more influenced by our fictitious scenarios about international recognition affecting their preferences for setting up of a new independent state without the consent of the host state. This is an important finding, because a majority of electors in both Scotland and Catalonia are risk averse, have multiple identities, and favour a third way between union and independence (Keating & McEwen, ; Liñeira & Cetrà, ).…”

The 2017 Catalan Independence Referendum: A Symposium

“…The referendum law was suspended by the Constitutional Court, and Spain's attorney general ordered security forces to prevent any preparations for the vote. The Catalan government decided to go ahead and organize the referendum unilaterally after several requests to hold a negotiated referendum, a symbolic vote on independence in 2014 (Liñeira and Cetrà 2015), and a subsequent 2015 regional election which returned a pro-independence majority (Martí and Cetrà 2016).…”