The Independence of the Bank of Japan in the Light of Statutory Rules and Central Bank Independence Indices

Bälz, Moritz; Heckel, Markus

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-17380-1_3

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…Afte the World War II, the BoJ was reorganized in accordance with democratizing monetary authority. Balz & Heckel (2015) discussed, however, the formal highest authority of Policy Board, or Seisaku iin-kai, which consists of seven members including the Governor, four experts and two government representatives from MoF and Economic Planning Agency, was limited, called "sleeping board." Actually, real power is held by the Executive Board and the Bank had been under the MoF control.…”

Section: Ivc2 Japanmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…His successor, Kuroda Haruhiko, introduced Quantitative and Qualitative Easing in 2013, which had supported the Abe's economic policy, too. While significant research figured out de jure CB Independence of BoJ had not changed 48 or even fragile against political pressure, and as Waldenberger (2015) wondered price stability would likely be abandoned politically after deflation era is over, Balz & Heckel (2015) raise the CBI points from perspectives of personal, functional, and financial independence. Thus, thorough analysis for political economy perspective for CB Independence of BoJ is needed.…”

Section: Ivc2 Japanmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Central Bank Independence and Policy Outcomes: A Trans-Boundary Comparison

Iksan

Konishi

2022

j. cent. bank. law and inst.

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This paper examines how Central Bank Independence (CB Independence), using a dataset that compiled by Garriga (2016), can explain the policy outcomes. This dataset was mainly compiled from Cukierman’s work (1995). The dataset identifies statutory reforms affecting CB Independence, their direction, and the attributes necessary with the aim of building on previous literature, the most widely used Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti index. The focus of this paper is empirically estimating causal inferences of inflation and economic growth with an explanatory variable of the central bank Independence measures. It has four components including central bank CEOs, central bank objectives, policy formulations and central bank lending limit policies. The second focus of this paper aims to harness the Asia Financial Crisis 1998-1999, as natural experiment to understand effect of crises by using semi-experimental method Difference-In-Difference (DID). Panel data regression and DID are two empirical research methods applied in this research. This paper proposes all four CB Independence measures can explain the inflation; but this paper does not find statistical support for the economic growth. Supported by DID estimation, this paper also estimates the effect of CB Independence to inflation and economic growth for the sample countries before and after the 1998 Asia financial crisis experienced by sample countries. To enrich our historicalinstitutional narrative, this paper underlines narrative under the tale of two countries – Japan and Indonesia as exemplify.

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Section: Ivc2 Japanmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Ivc2 Japanmentioning

confidence: 99%