The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective

Landes, William M.; Posner, Richard A.

doi:10.1086/466849

Cited by 538 publications

(177 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

168

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…This corroborates the theory as well. More comprehensive empirical tests of Landes and Posner's (1975) theory, particularly with regard to the importance of judicial independence for the performance of the labor market, are still lacking. In general, the labor market effects of the quality of the legal system as a whole have not yet been analyzed empirically.…”

Section: Previous Empirical Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, our two hypotheses could be challenged by two counterhypotheses deduced from Landes and Posner's (1975) ''economic theory of the independent judiciary''. This theory is based on the public choice approach, according to which laws are the result of competition between interest groups.…”

Section: Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 89%

“…In order to improve their prospects of being re-elected, politicians meet the demands of the most important interest groups. According to Landes and Posner (1975), an independent judiciary interprets and applies legislation primarily in accordance with the original intent of the enacting legislature. It thus protects privileges that influential interest groups have gained in the past and enhances their durability.…”

Section: Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The independent judiciary applies these laws in the long run and interprets them in an especially restrictive manner. As the influence of interest groups may impair allocative efficiency and labor market performance via such laws, we may deduce the following first counterhypothesis from Landes and Posner's (1975) theory: the more independent the judiciary, the higher unemployment and the lower employment tend to be, ceteris paribus. As far-reaching dismissal protection, high statutory minimum wages and similar restrictive labor laws especially hurt women and youths and as, according to Landes and Posner (1975), an independent judiciary applies such laws in the long run and interprets them in an especially restrictive manner, we may deduce the following second counterhypothesis from their theory: the more independent the judiciary, the higher unemployment and the lower employment among women and youths tend to be, ceteris paribus; an independent judiciary has a disproportionately adverse impact on the employment situation of these demographic groups.…”

Section: Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

The quality of the legal system and labor market performance around the world

Feldmann

2009

Eur J Law Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Section: Previous Empirical Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 89%

Section: Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

The quality of the legal system and labor market performance around the world

Feldmann

2009

Eur J Law Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…How are interest-group pressures related to the behavior of the judiciary? By this I mean theories of the judiciary as a long-run contract enforcer of legislative bargains with interest groups (Landes and Posner 1975). 5.…”

Section: Other Issuesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Interest‐Group Theory of Government: Problems and Prospects

Tollison

2001

Kyklos

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Judicial Independence

Clark¹

2015

Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

For analytic clarity, judicial independence is best thought of as a concept that captures a variety of features of a judicial system. One common, and useful, approach is to associate judicial independence with the ability of judges to, in practice, make decisions the outcomes of which are not dictated by extrajudicial pressures. In this spirit, research on judicial independence has examined a number of topics, two of which are (i) the origins and determinants of political support for the judiciary and (ii) the consequences of maintaining judicial independence for economic performance. Original research on political support for the judiciary focused on how a system of separation of powers can constrain judicial independence. Current research is turning the question around, examining the role courts play as a component of a system in which policy is made collectively by political institutions. Research on the relationship between judicial independence and economic performance originally examined whether greater judicial independence is associated with higher levels of economic growth. Current research is expanding the focus to evaluate the conditions under which independent courts reinforce the stability of democratic government. As research on judicial independence moves forward, it should focus on further conceptual clarification, the study of independent courts as complements to other parts of a system of governance (rather than competitors to policy makers), and leveraging current advances for theoretically driven measurement of these concepts.

show abstract

The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective

Cited by 538 publications

References 0 publications

The quality of the legal system and labor market performance around the world

The quality of the legal system and labor market performance around the world

The Interest‐Group Theory of Government: Problems and Prospects

Judicial Independence

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About