The individual cost of sick leave

Markussen, Simen

doi:10.1007/s00148-011-0390-8

Cited by 81 publications

(59 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…Det kan likevel ikke utelukkes at sykefravaer mer indirekte har betydning for hvordan arbeidstakere blir vurdert og behandlet både når det gjelder oppsigelser og for eksempel ved lønnsfastsettelse eller opprykk til høyere stillinger. Undersøkelser tyder på at høyt fravaer kan føre til dårligere lønnsutvikling, dog uten at de spesifikke mekanismene som gir dette resultatet er klarlagt (se for eksempel Markussen 2012). Frykt for slike negative konsekvenser kan føre til at arbeidstakere har lavere sykefravaer enn de ellers ville ha hatt.…”

Section: Hva Kan Forklare Høyere Sykefravaer I Offentlig Sektor?unclassified

Sykefravær i offentlig og privat sektor

Mastekaasa¹

2016

SPA

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SammendragData fra Statistisk sentralbyrås arbeidskraftundersøkelser 2006-2012 kombinert med registerdata brukes til å undersøke forskjeller i sykefravaer mellom statlig, kommunal og privat sektor. Det samlete sykefravaeret er klart høyest i kommunene, mens det ikke er noen signifikant forskjell mellom staten og privat sektor. En god del av forskjellen mellom kommune, stat og privat sektor skyldes de ansattes kjønns-og alderssammensetning; også med kontroll for disse forholdene samt blant annet utdanning og yrke er imidlertid fravaeret tolv prosent høyere i kommunal enn i privat sektor. For fravaer av inntil én ukes varighet ligger både staten og kommunene klart høyere enn privat sektor, og her er forskjellene lite påvirket av kontroll for andre variabler.Nøkkelord: sykefravaer, offentlig sektor, privat sektor, kommuner Abstract: Sickness absence in the public and private sectors In this article, data from Statistics Norway's Labour Force Surveys 2006-2012 are combined with administrative register data and used to examine sectoral differences in sickness absence. Overall, sickness absence is clearly highest in the municipal sector, whereas there is no significant difference between the state and the private sector. A substantial part of the difference is due to gender and age distribution; even with control for these and several other variables (such as level of education), however, a 12 percent difference between municipalities and the private sector remains. Sickness absence of one week's duration or less is higher among both state and municipality employees than among those in the private sector, the differences are in this case little affected when controlling for other variables.

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Section: Hva Kan Forklare Høyere Sykefravaer I Offentlig Sektor?unclassified

Sykefravær i offentlig og privat sektor

Mastekaasa¹

2016

SPA

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“…Hence, the functional relationship q(d) reflects the negative impact of absence on future (expected) income, for which there is also substantial empirical evidence (see Hansen 2000, Hesselius 2007, Henningsen and Haegeland 2008, Andersen 2010, and Markussen 2012.…”

Section: Foundationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Trade union membership and sickness absence: Evidence from a sick pay reform

Goerke

Pannenberg

2015

Labour Economics

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. In 1996, statutory sick pay was reduced for private sector workers in Germany. Using the empirical observation that trade union members are dismissed less often than non-members, we construct a model to predict how absence behaviour will respond to the sick pay reform. Terms of use: Documents inWe show that union members may have stronger incentives to be absent and to react to the cut in sick pay. In the empirical investigation, we find a positive relationship between trade union membership and absence due to sickness and observe more pronounced reactions to the cut in sick pay among union members than among non-members. These findings suggest that more flexibility in the use of paid absence due to sickness constitutes a private gain from trade union membership.JEL-Code: I180, J510, J220.Keywords: difference-in-differences, sickness-related absence, Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), statutory sick pay, trade union membership. We are grateful to Nicolas Ziebarth for helpful comments and for providing background information on industry-specific bargaining contracts. Also, special thanks to Laszlo Goerke

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“…Similarly, Markussen (2012) has shown that sick leave has a negative effect on subsequent earnings and employment.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 98%

Absenteeism, Unemployment and Employment Protection Legislation: Evidence from Italy

Scoppa

Vuri

2013

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractEfficiency wages theories argue that the threat of firing, coupled with a high unemployment rate, is a mechanism that discourages employee shirking in asymmetric information contexts. Our empirical analysis aims to test the role of unemployment as a worker discipline device, considering the different degree of job security offered by the Italian Employment Protection Legislation to workers employed in small and large firms. Controlling for a number of individual and firm characteristics, we investigate the relationship between worker's absences which act as a proxy for employee shirking and local unemployment rate (at the provincial level). We find a strong negative association between unemployment and absenteeism rate, larger in magnitude in small firms due presumably to a significantly lower protection from dismissals in these firms. As an indirect test of the role of unemployment as worker discipline device, we show that public sector employees, almost impossible to fire, do not react to the local unemployment. JEL codes: J41; M51; J45

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The individual cost of sick leave

Cited by 81 publications

References 17 publications

Sykefravær i offentlig og privat sektor

Sykefravær i offentlig og privat sektor

Trade union membership and sickness absence: Evidence from a sick pay reform

Absenteeism, Unemployment and Employment Protection Legislation: Evidence from Italy

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