The Indo-Pacific Strategy and US Alliance Network Expandability: Asian Middle Powers’ Positions on Sino-US Geostrategic Competition in Indo-Pacific Region

Jung, Sung Chul; Lee, Jaehyon; Lee, Ji Yong

doi:10.1080/10670564.2020.1766909

Cited by 30 publications

(14 citation statements)

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“…In response to this Chinese expansionism, the United States has introduced the Indo-Pacific strategy to contain the power of this communist giant within Northeast Asia. 100 The United States also strengthened its military alliance with Australia, India, and Japan to curtail the rise of China in the region. 101 Connected to this geopolitical tension, a trade dispute between the two giant economies broke out in 2018, and this altercation has further deepened the Sino-US conflicts.…”

Section: Beijing 2022: Emerging Superpower and New Cold War Games?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Olympic Winter Games in Non-Western Cities: State, Sport and Cultural Diplomacy in Sochi 2014, PyeongChang 2018 and Beijing 2022

Lee

2021

The International Journal of the History of Sport

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The summer and winter Olympics share the five-ring logo. However, their social and political connotations differ. The Olympic Winter Games displays an aura of a game for the rich and powerful. A few aspiring nations intend to host this luxurious sporting festival in order to polish their international reputations as powerful actors in the global capitalist order. The cases of Sochi 2014, PyeongChang 2018 and Beijing 2022 illustrate this pattern. Wallerstein's world-system theory is a useful conceptual tool to examine the context of each Olympics, the content of the Olympic ceremonies, the nature of athletic competitions, and the post-event political environment. Although the three nations have different historical backgrounds and different diplomatic aims, the winter Olympics provided the trio with an opportunity to construct an image of major global or regional power. Russian Olympic diplomacy in Sochi was impressive but its post-event aggression undercut its soft power exercise on the ice. South Korea acquired desired political outcomes by hosting the Olympic Winter Games and its peace campaign continued after the event. China has the potential to highlight its emerging world power status at Beijing 2022. Yet, increasing China scepticism in the West may impede its winter Olympic diplomacy.While the summer and winter Olympics are global sport mega-events that share the identical five-ring logo, the social and political connotations of the two occasions differ significantly. 1 Most notably, the global north and south divide is more clearly visible at the Olympic Winter Games than its summer counterpart because economic and cultural barriers to winter sports are higher than most summer sporting activities. 2 At the same time, the winter Olympics today seems to reinforce Western cultural hegemony and white privilege as North American, European and Scandinavian athletes prevail in most of the winter Olympic events. 3 The winter sport mega-event awarded to non-Western cities, namely Sochi 2014, PyeongChang 2018 and Beijing 2022, involves a distinctive interplay amongst state, sport, and cultural diplomacy. 4 Despite, or because of, the economic and cultural

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Section: Beijing 2022: Emerging Superpower and New Cold War Games?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Olympic Winter Games in Non-Western Cities: State, Sport and Cultural Diplomacy in Sochi 2014, PyeongChang 2018 and Beijing 2022

Lee

2021

The International Journal of the History of Sport

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“…By employing this strategy, states can avoid paying unnecessary costs and/or secure benefits from multiple sides. Reluctance to join the United States' strategy for the Indo-Pacific region and ambiguous policy positioning of some Asian middle powers such as Indonesia and Vietnam between the United States and the PRC are such examples (Jung et al, 2021).…”

Section: Strategic Ambiguitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Taking a side between the United States and the People’s Republic of China: Strategic hedging of South Korea and India

Hwang

Ryou-Ellison

2021

International Area Studies Review

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This paper explores how South Korea and India have taken positions between the United States and the People’s Republic of China over diverse foreign policy issues. By adopting dual engagement and strategic ambiguity as hedging strategies, both regional powers reduce their vulnerability to the influence and pressure of the two great powers. Thanks to their strategic importance and prominence in regional politics enhanced by such strategies, South Korea and India can independently pursue their foreign policy preferences to a great extent. The analysis of voting behavior of these regional powers in the United Nations General Assembly between 1991 and 2018 confirms our expectations.

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“…37 In the Indo-Pacific, for example, the Quad alliance (Australia, India, Japan, and the US) has provided the platform for Asian middle powers to engage China's rise, but certain middle powers, such as South Korea and Indonesia, strive to retain their autonomy and develop their own policy options for engaging with the liberal order. 38 The potential for an autonomous coalition of Southern middle powers is also uncertain. The IBSA (India, Brazil, and South Africa) group often references democracy as the pillar for resolving conflicts (especially in declarations throughout 2003-2011), but the group is now subsumed by the BRICS, and is hesitant to question Russia and China's authoritarianism and unable to deploy its democratic credentials to support democracy-promotion.…”

Section: Restricted Like-mindednessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Southern middle powers and the liberal international order: The options for Brazil and South Africa

Efstathopoulos

2021

International Journal

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The current challenges facing the liberal international order suggest there is greater need for reassessing the roles that different categories of states may perform in support of this order. Middle powers appear as leading candidates for a supportive role to the liberal order due to their historical commitment to internationalism, coalition building with like-minded democracies and activism within multilateral institutions. Such orientation, however, is questionable for Southern middle powers that often appear ambivalent in their foreign policies, restricted in their collaboration with other democracies and selective in their multilateral initiatives. This article discusses the cases of Brazil and South Africa to examine the current options for Southern middle powers and concludes that despite certain limitations, South Africa is, overall, closer to assuming a supportive stance towards the liberal international order and its institutions.

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The Indo-Pacific Strategy and US Alliance Network Expandability: Asian Middle Powers’ Positions on Sino-US Geostrategic Competition in Indo-Pacific Region

Cited by 30 publications

References 0 publications

Olympic Winter Games in Non-Western Cities: State, Sport and Cultural Diplomacy in Sochi 2014, PyeongChang 2018 and Beijing 2022

Olympic Winter Games in Non-Western Cities: State, Sport and Cultural Diplomacy in Sochi 2014, PyeongChang 2018 and Beijing 2022

Taking a side between the United States and the People’s Republic of China: Strategic hedging of South Korea and India

Southern middle powers and the liberal international order: The options for Brazil and South Africa

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