The Influence of American Economists on the Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to analyze American economists' influence in the passing of the Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts (1914). Specifically, it is argued and documented that American economists were important in this process in two ways. Many economists exercised an "indirect" influence by discussing in academic journals and books problems concerning trusts, combinations, and the necessary measures to preserve the working of competitive markets. At least as importantly, if not more so, some economists took an active role in the reform movement both contributing to draft proposals for the amendment of existing antitrust legislation and providing help and advice during the Congressional debates which led to the passing of the FTC and Clayton Acts. Among these, we will focus primarily, albeit not exclusively, on the contribution of John Bates Clark.

Az Amerikai Egyesült Államok trösztellenes szabályozása – a Sherman Act-től a Celler-Kefauver Act-ig

“…o.). A törvény értelmében jogellenesnek minősült az árdiszkrimináció, az árukapcsolás és a kizárólagos forgalmazás, a versenytárs vállalkozás bekebelezése és a vállalati igazgatóságok összekapcsolása (Neumann, 2001;Fiorito, 2011;DoJ, 2012). Neumann (2001) kiemeli továbbá, hogy míg "a Sherman Act a monopolerő káros hatásait kívánta elhárítani, és …karakterét tekintve defenzív volt, a Clayton Act pozitív lökést adott az USA antitröszt szabályozásának" (34.…”

“…4 A témában l. részletesebben: Török, 2001. 5 A Szövetségi Kereskedelmi Bizottság feladata az USA antitrösztszabályozásának adminisztratív jellegű kiteljesítése volt (Fiorito, 2011), azaz "vizsgálódási és ítélkezési feladatokkal rendelkezett" (Viscusi -Vernon -Harrington, Jr., 2000: 66. o.…”

When Economics Faces the Economy: John Bates Clark and the 1914 Antitrust Legislation

“…In January 20, 1914-roughly one month after the NCF had circulated its draft bill-Wilson decided to lay out his own antitrust agenda in a landmark 12 As to Jenks, the other economist in the NCF committee, I was unable to find any explicit endorsement of a commission with licensing powers in his professional writings of the time, and even his condemnation of unfair competition was cautiously phrased and always conditional on circumstances (Fiorito, 2011).…”

“…(Clark & Clark, 1912, pp. 59-60) With this proposal, the Clarks joined a growing number of economists who had expressed confidence in the ability of an administrative agency to deal with antitrust problems (Fiorito, 2011). While the participants in the policy debate were largely silent on the question of what procedural devices would be appropriate to achieve the agency objectives, two distinct visions of such a commission did emerge.…”