The influence of cognitive load on self-presentation: Can cognitive busyness help as well as harm social performance?

Abstract

Extra cognitive loads can hinder challenging self-presentations by usurping needed cognitive resources but also may sometimes improve them by shifting attention away from negative self-preoccupation. In Study 1, extraverts and introverts participated in an interview in which they presented themselves as either extraverted or introverted. Congruent self-presentations, which should be cognitively nondemanding, were unaffected by a cognitive busyness manipulation (rehearsing an 8-digit number). However, incongruent self-presentations were affected by busyness. Busyness decreased the effectiveness of extraverts who tried to appear introverted but increased the effectiveness of introverts who tried to appear extraverted. Study 2 found that introverts, who also tend to be socially anxious, reported less public self-consciousness and fewer negative self-focused thoughts when they were busy than when they were not busy.

Automatic Cognitive Processes and Nonverbal Communication

“…Participants who used nondefault self-presentational strategies (e.g., modesty with strangers) were not able to pursue these strategies automatically and used conscious cognitive resources to accomplish their goals (see also Patterson, Churchill, Farag, & Borden, 1991/1992. Other research has also demonstrated that self-presenting in a way that is inconsistent with personality is cognitively taxing and requires attentional resources (Pontari & Schlenker, 2000).…”

Use of the Extreme Groups Approach: A Critical Reexamination and New Recommendations.

“…For example, Pontari and Schlenker (2000) assessed accuracy of recall in a role-playing task only for people scoring in the outer tertiles of an introversion/extraversion scale. Similarly, Deffenbacher, Huff, Lynch, Oetting, and Salvatore (2000) administered the Driving Anger Scale to a large sample as a screening instrument, retaining for further analysis only those individuals scoring in the upper and lower quartiles.…”

How Much Does Effortful Thinking Underlie Observers’ Reactions to Victimization?

“…Similarly, placing participants under a large memory load restricts people's capacity to think carefully and deliberatively (e.g., Gilbert & Osborne, 1989;Krull, Seger, & Silvera, 2008;Pontari & Schlenker, 2000). For example, Pontari and Schlenker (2000) demonstrated that when people are under memory load (i.e., rehearsing an 8-digit number while performing a concurrent task), they are less efficient at the demanding task of presenting themselves as an introvert when they are actually an extrovert. Finally, the REI has been shown to predict differences in behavior and cognition in regards to experiential and rational thinking styles (e.g., Pacini & Epstein, 1999).…”

“…Manipulating the time available for participants to make their responses is a well-documented way to produce cognitive load, as little time is available for people to think rationally, make complex links, or fully utilize controlled cognitive resources (e.g., Hernandez & Preston, 2013;Rand et al, 2012). Similarly, placing participants under a large memory load restricts people's capacity to think carefully and deliberatively (e.g., Gilbert & Osborne, 1989;Krull, Seger, & Silvera, 2008;Pontari & Schlenker, 2000). For example, Pontari and Schlenker (2000) demonstrated that when people are under memory load (i.e., rehearsing an 8-digit number while performing a concurrent task), they are less efficient at the demanding task of presenting themselves as an introvert when they are actually an extrovert.…”

“…Across 7 experiments, we either (a) manipulated effortful thinking directly via time pressure or memory load manipulations (e.g., Gilbert & Osborne, 1989;Pontari & Schlenker, 2000;Rand et al, 2012;Roskes, Elliot, Nijstad, & De Dreu, in press;Shalvi, Eldar, & Bereby-Meyer, 2012;van den Bos, Peters, Bobocel, & Ybema, 2006), (b) measured individual differences in rational and experiential thinking styles using the Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI; Pacini & Epstein, 1999), or (c) primed intuitive or rational thinking (van den Bos & Maas, 2009). Manipulating the time available for participants to make their responses is a well-documented way to produce cognitive load, as little time is available for people to think rationally, make complex links, or fully utilize controlled cognitive resources (e.g., Hernandez & Preston, 2013;Rand et al, 2012).…”