The Influence of Collusive Information Dissemination on Bidder’s Collusive Willingness in Urban Construction Projects

Abstract

The process of urbanization and urban regeneration is inseparable from the implementation of urban construction projects. Current studies show a large amount of collusive bidding in urban construction projects, which has seriously affected healthy and sustainable urban development. Therefore, the governance of collusive bidding in urban construction projects is crucial to sustainable urbanization and urban renewal. In reality, the collusion information dissemination (CID) is a key influential factor in the bidder’s collusive willingness (BCW). Knowing the influence of CID on BCW will help city managers to have a clearer understanding of the causes and governance focus of collusive bidding. Thus, the study using the multi-agent simulation technology simulates the influence of CID on BCW in different market scales, communication intensities, and trust boundaries based on the Deffuant model. The research found that the negative impact of the CID on the market is more incredible in cities with smaller market sizes, and effectively inhibiting the CID can reduce the occurrence of collusion. Moreover, the research also found that colluders always form their collusive alliances within CID networks. These findings suggest that urban managers should strengthen the suppression of collusive bidding by weakening the dissemination of collusive information and blocking the CID networks.

Critical barriers and countermeasures to urban regeneration from the stakeholder perspective: a literature review

“…For example, the Greek planning system and its provisions for the renewal of degraded urban areas have been regarded as an obstacle to implementing urban regeneration projects (Yiannakou, 2020). Although rapidly densifying cities routinely approve development plans that defy zoning permission, conditional on negotiations with developers for public benefits such as affordable social housing (Biggar, 2021), this could increase the bargaining rights of developers and introduce unintended risks like corruption (Wang X. et al, 2022). Third, the planning does not always work effectively due to the absence of multi-stakeholder collaboration and the difficulties in allocating the associated costs and benefits (Yiannakou, 2020;Zhou et al, 2021).…”

Break the Cycle of Collusion: Simulation to Influence Mechanism of Cognitive Bias on To-Collude Decision Making

“…Factors affecting the to-collude decision making are anchored in bidders' communication and trust [16]. Although the values of collusion detection [18,19], the causality of collusion [20], bidder's collusive willingness [21], and the determinants and factors of collusion [22,23] have been presented in previous studies, further exploration seems feasible to construct conspirators' decisionmaking mechanisms from the perspective of cognitive bias.…”