2018
DOI: 10.1108/s1569-373220180000020006
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The Influence of Corporate Governance Mechanisms on the Behavior of Financial Analysts of US Firms: An Empirical Analysis

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Cited by 8 publications
(12 citation statements)
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“…The positive and non significant coefficient on DUAL indicates that in the case of jointly assuming both of the directors' board chairman and the CEO responsibilities during a public offering procedure, the firm's monitoring mechanism turns out to be less efficient and its credibility will be questioned, which is likely to generate less reliable earnings forecasts (Bouteska, 2018).…”
Section: Moderated-analysis Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The positive and non significant coefficient on DUAL indicates that in the case of jointly assuming both of the directors' board chairman and the CEO responsibilities during a public offering procedure, the firm's monitoring mechanism turns out to be less efficient and its credibility will be questioned, which is likely to generate less reliable earnings forecasts (Bouteska, 2018).…”
Section: Moderated-analysis Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The purpose of CG is to minimise agency conflicts and ensure that managers put shareholders' interests first (Epps & Ismail, 2008;Jensen & Meckling, 1976;Vasilakopoulos et al, 2018). The boards of directors are regarded as the most significant component of CG, and their main duties include maintaining a close watch on management's conduct and defending the interests of shareholders (Bouteska, 2018). The board of directors is responsible for overseeing and regulating manager behavior as one of the CG mechanisms to make sure they work in the best interests of shareholders and safeguard their investment (Metawee, 2013;Vasilakopoulos et al, 2018).…”
Section: Supervisory Board Size and Emmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Dual management denotes attributing the same person the responsibilities of a general manager along with those associated with the chairman of the directors' board over the same period. Previous research has highlighted that in the case of jointly assuming both of the directors' board chairman and the CEO responsibilities during a public offering procedure, the firm's monitoring mechanism turns out to be less efficient and its credibility will be questioned, which is likely to generate less reliable earnings forecasts (Bouteska, 2018).…”
Section: 1mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Similarly, the forecast publication usually stands as an indication of good news. Bouteska (2018) argues that analysts' earnings forecasts are more accurate for companies where blockholder ownership, either by managers or external entities, have larger quoted spreads. Thus, both signals turn out to target the same purpose, and the authors highlight the predominance of a positive relationship binding the capital share held by the leaders and the forecasts' publishing procedure as well as the quality of such distributed information.…”
Section: 3mentioning
confidence: 99%
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