Abstract:Many decisions are thought to arise via the accumulation of noisy evidence to a threshold or bound. In perception, the mechanism explains the effect of stimulus strength, characterized by signal-to-noise ratio, on decision speed, accuracy and confidence. It also makes intriguing predictions about the noise itself. An increase in noise should lead to faster decisions, reduced accuracy and, paradoxically, higher confidence. To test these predictions, we introduce a novel sensory manipulation that mimics the addi… Show more
“…In contrast, the aware model predicts a downward shift, with predicted ‘% more visible’ at d′ = 0 of 42.7%, which is significantly smaller than the ‘% more visible’ at d′ = 0 shown by subjects (t(13) = 3.629, p = .003) (Figure 2b). Thus, the blind model correctly predicted visibility would increase as a result of TMS in keeping with other findings in the literature (Rahnev et al 2011; Rahnev, Bahdo, et al 2012; Fetsch et al 2014; Zylberberg, Roelfsema, and Sigman 2014; Rahnev, Maniscalco, et al 2012; Zylberberg et al 2016), but the aware model incorrectly predicted visibility would decrease in concert with the reduction in objective performance. The aware model’s incorrect interpretation is in line with the hypothesis that TMS simply produces near-threshold conscious perception by reducing introspective reports in concert with a reduction in objective performance (e.g., Lloyd et al, (2013)).…”
Section: Resultssupporting
confidence: 86%
“…Alternatively, it may be possible for an observer to be unaware of noise or other changes in its sensory processing system (Ko and Lau 2012; Zylberberg et al 2016; Zylberberg, Roelfsema, and Sigman 2014), as has also been suggested in cases of sensory adaptation (Seriès, Stocker, and Simoncelli 2009). In the current paradigm, such an observer would be metacognitively blind , i.e.…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This is not to suggest that metacognitive sensitivity (e.g., meta-d′, Maniscalco and Lau 2012) is necessarily zero, but instead that the observer makes introspective judgments on the basis of an incorrect internal model. This results in an increase in subjective visibility for these samples, as they are judged to be ‘extreme’ according to the narrower expected noise (Rahnev et al 2011; Rahnev, Bahdo, et al 2012; Fetsch et al 2014; Zylberberg, Roelfsema, and Sigman 2014; Rahnev, Maniscalco, et al 2012; Zylberberg et al 2016). Thus, for the metacognitively blind observer, the predicted effect is an increase in subjective target visibility, manifested as an increase in ‘% more visible’ judgments.…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This is because they have internal knowledge of the statistics governing their sensory inferences (Lau 2007; Ko and Lau 2012; King and Dehaene 2014), including any noise introduced by TMS (Figure 1c, top row). Alternatively, it has been suggested that observers may be unaware of changes in their sensory processing architecture that can affect perceptual inferences (Seriès, Stocker, and Simoncelli 2009), which might lead them to introspectively judge noisier samples to be more extreme, leading to higher visibility ratings (Rahnev, Maniscalco, et al 2012; Zylberberg, Roelfsema, and Sigman 2014; Fetsch et al 2014; Rahnev et al 2011; Rahnev, Bahdo, et al 2012; Zylberberg et al 2016) (Figure 1c, bottom row).…”
Blindsight patients with damage to the visual cortex can discriminate objects but report no conscious visual experience. This provides an intriguing opportunity to allow the study of subjective awareness in isolation from objective performance capacity. However, blindsight is rare, so one promising way to induce the effect in neurologically intact observers is to apply transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to the visual cortex. Here, we used a recently-developed criterion-free method to conclusively rule out an important alternative interpretation of TMS-induced performance without awareness: that TMS-induced blindsight may be just due to conservative reporting biases for conscious perception. Critically, using this criterion-free paradigm we have previously shown that introspective judgments were optimal even under visual masking. However, here under TMS, observers were suboptimal, as if they were metacognitively blind to the visual disturbances caused by TMS. We argue that metacognitive judgments depend on observers’ internal statistical models of their own perceptual systems, and introspective suboptimality arises when external perturbations abruptly make those models invalid -- a phenomenon that may also be happening in actual blindsight.
“…In contrast, the aware model predicts a downward shift, with predicted ‘% more visible’ at d′ = 0 of 42.7%, which is significantly smaller than the ‘% more visible’ at d′ = 0 shown by subjects (t(13) = 3.629, p = .003) (Figure 2b). Thus, the blind model correctly predicted visibility would increase as a result of TMS in keeping with other findings in the literature (Rahnev et al 2011; Rahnev, Bahdo, et al 2012; Fetsch et al 2014; Zylberberg, Roelfsema, and Sigman 2014; Rahnev, Maniscalco, et al 2012; Zylberberg et al 2016), but the aware model incorrectly predicted visibility would decrease in concert with the reduction in objective performance. The aware model’s incorrect interpretation is in line with the hypothesis that TMS simply produces near-threshold conscious perception by reducing introspective reports in concert with a reduction in objective performance (e.g., Lloyd et al, (2013)).…”
Section: Resultssupporting
confidence: 86%
“…Alternatively, it may be possible for an observer to be unaware of noise or other changes in its sensory processing system (Ko and Lau 2012; Zylberberg et al 2016; Zylberberg, Roelfsema, and Sigman 2014), as has also been suggested in cases of sensory adaptation (Seriès, Stocker, and Simoncelli 2009). In the current paradigm, such an observer would be metacognitively blind , i.e.…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This is not to suggest that metacognitive sensitivity (e.g., meta-d′, Maniscalco and Lau 2012) is necessarily zero, but instead that the observer makes introspective judgments on the basis of an incorrect internal model. This results in an increase in subjective visibility for these samples, as they are judged to be ‘extreme’ according to the narrower expected noise (Rahnev et al 2011; Rahnev, Bahdo, et al 2012; Fetsch et al 2014; Zylberberg, Roelfsema, and Sigman 2014; Rahnev, Maniscalco, et al 2012; Zylberberg et al 2016). Thus, for the metacognitively blind observer, the predicted effect is an increase in subjective target visibility, manifested as an increase in ‘% more visible’ judgments.…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This is because they have internal knowledge of the statistics governing their sensory inferences (Lau 2007; Ko and Lau 2012; King and Dehaene 2014), including any noise introduced by TMS (Figure 1c, top row). Alternatively, it has been suggested that observers may be unaware of changes in their sensory processing architecture that can affect perceptual inferences (Seriès, Stocker, and Simoncelli 2009), which might lead them to introspectively judge noisier samples to be more extreme, leading to higher visibility ratings (Rahnev, Maniscalco, et al 2012; Zylberberg, Roelfsema, and Sigman 2014; Fetsch et al 2014; Rahnev et al 2011; Rahnev, Bahdo, et al 2012; Zylberberg et al 2016) (Figure 1c, bottom row).…”
Blindsight patients with damage to the visual cortex can discriminate objects but report no conscious visual experience. This provides an intriguing opportunity to allow the study of subjective awareness in isolation from objective performance capacity. However, blindsight is rare, so one promising way to induce the effect in neurologically intact observers is to apply transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to the visual cortex. Here, we used a recently-developed criterion-free method to conclusively rule out an important alternative interpretation of TMS-induced performance without awareness: that TMS-induced blindsight may be just due to conservative reporting biases for conscious perception. Critically, using this criterion-free paradigm we have previously shown that introspective judgments were optimal even under visual masking. However, here under TMS, observers were suboptimal, as if they were metacognitively blind to the visual disturbances caused by TMS. We argue that metacognitive judgments depend on observers’ internal statistical models of their own perceptual systems, and introspective suboptimality arises when external perturbations abruptly make those models invalid -- a phenomenon that may also be happening in actual blindsight.
“…Relaxing some of H and M’s assumptions (e.g. including noise that scales with the strength of the evidence [Zylberberg et al, 2016]) caused even stronger crosstalk.10.7554/eLife.17331.003Figure 1.Interaction between the accuracies at L1 and L2.We computed the psychometric function for the L2 decision for trials with a correct (green traces) or erroneous (red) decision at L1. Left, H and M model with infinite bounds collapsing after 500 ms. Middle, H and M model with high bounds that are stable.…”
The study of decision-making has mainly focused on isolated decisions where choices are associated with motor actions. However, problem-solving often involves considering a hierarchy of sub-decisions. In a recent study (Lorteije et al. 2015), we reported behavioral and neuronal evidence for hierarchical decision making in a task with a small decision tree. We observed a first phase of parallel evidence integration for multiple sub-decisions, followed by a phase in which the overall strategy formed. It has been suggested that a 'flat' competition between the ultimate motor actions might also explain these results. A reanalysis of the data does not support the critical predictions of flat models. We also examined the time-course of decision making in other, related tasks and report conditions where evidence integration for successive decisions is decoupled, which excludes flat models. We conclude that the flexibility of decision-making implies that the strategies are genuinely hierarchical.DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.7554/eLife.17331.001
External sources of information influence human actions. However, psychological traits (PTs), considered internal variables, also play a crucial role in decision making. PTs are stable across time and contexts and define the set of behavioral repertoires that individuals express. Here, we explored how multiple metrics of adaptive behavior under uncertainty related to several PTs. Participants solved a reversal‐learning task with volatile contingencies, from which we characterized a detailed behavioral profile based on their response sequences. We then tested the relationship between this multimetric behavioral profile and scores obtained from self‐report psychological questionnaires. The PT measurements were based on the Hierarchical Taxonomy Of Psychopathology (HiTOP) model. By using multiple linear regression models (MLRMs), we found that the learning curves predicted important differences in the PTs and task response times. We confirmed the significance of these relationships by using random permutations of the predictors of the MLRM. Therefore, the behavioral profile configurations predicted the PTs and served as a “fingerprint” to identify participants with a high certainty level. We discuss briefly how this characterization and approach could contribute to better nosological classifications.
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