“…Their finding is consistent with the notion that highly leveraged firms are near tax exhaustion, and are therefore less likely to benefit from the use of after-tax incentives. Carnes and Guffey (2000) conduct a study similar to Newman (1989), using a more recent sample, and confirm Newman's findings. Finally, Dhaliwal et al (2000) use refined estimates of tax planning opportunities to examine the determinants of the choice to use after-tax earnings measures in CEO compensation.…”
Section: Determinants Of Using Pre-tax Versus After-tax Earnings In Csupporting
confidence: 67%
“…For example, the use of after-tax earnings in compensation contracts is observed byHealy (1985) for 47.3% of sample firms, byNewman (1989) for 33.9% of sample firms, byGaver et al (1995) for 41.9% of sample firms, byCarnes and Guffey (2000) for 30.1% of sample firms, and byPhillips (2003) for 61.2% of sample firms.…”
“…Their finding is consistent with the notion that highly leveraged firms are near tax exhaustion, and are therefore less likely to benefit from the use of after-tax incentives. Carnes and Guffey (2000) conduct a study similar to Newman (1989), using a more recent sample, and confirm Newman's findings. Finally, Dhaliwal et al (2000) use refined estimates of tax planning opportunities to examine the determinants of the choice to use after-tax earnings measures in CEO compensation.…”
Section: Determinants Of Using Pre-tax Versus After-tax Earnings In Csupporting
confidence: 67%
“…For example, the use of after-tax earnings in compensation contracts is observed byHealy (1985) for 47.3% of sample firms, byNewman (1989) for 33.9% of sample firms, byGaver et al (1995) for 41.9% of sample firms, byCarnes and Guffey (2000) for 30.1% of sample firms, and byPhillips (2003) for 61.2% of sample firms.…”
“…Their finding is consistent with the notion that highly leveraged firms are near tax exhaustion and are therefore less likely to benefit from the use of after‐tax incentives. Carnes and Guffey () conduct a study similar to Newman , using a more recent sample, and confirm Newman's findings. Finally, Dhaliwal, Sneed, and Trezevant () use refined estimates of tax planning opportunities to examine the determinants of the choice to use after‐tax earnings measures in CEO compensation.…”
Section: Related Literature and Hypotheses Developmentmentioning
confidence: 61%
“…The use of after‐tax earnings in compensation contracts is observed by Healy () for 47.3 percent of sample firms, by Newman () for 33.9 percent of sample firms, by Gaver et al. () for 41.9 percent of sample firms, by Carnes and Guffey () for 30.1 percent of sample firms, and by Phillips () for 61.2 percent of sample firms.…”
“…3 it was concluded that the new standard had indeed resulted in a situation in which a larger number of segments are reported. Carnes and Guffey (2000) do not discuss the choice of bonus plan from the individual executive's perspective, but rather found a connection between the bonus plan chosen in multinational companies and the number of segments that the company was operating in. The existence of more segments provided an incentive for the company to use specific reward models that could enhance executives' strategic thinking with regard to taxes.…”
Section: Segment Reporting and Effects On Rewards And Compensationmentioning
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