The influence of leadership and smart level on the strategy choice of the smart logistics platform: a perspective of collaborative innovation participation

Liu, Weihua; Long, Shangsong; Liang, Yanjie; Wang, Jinkun; Wei, Shuang

doi:10.1007/s10479-021-04063-7

Cited by 15 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 40 publications

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“…Bai et al studied the value cocreation impact mechanism of network freight platforms in the Internet of Tings environment and found that service-dominant logic, transport demand subject participation, and relational embeddedness all promote value cocreation [7]. Liu et al studied the efects of coinnovating with the provider when the platform requires the provider to innovate new value-added services [28].…”

Section: Research On the Behavior Of Carriers Shippers Andmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of a Logistics Service Supply Chain Cooperation Mechanism for Network Freight Platforms

Wang,

Hu,

Wang

et al. 2024

International Journal of Intelligent Systems

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The rapid development of network freight platforms has directly increased the level of social logistics resource collaboration and improved both the efficiency and quality of logistics industry services. As a bilateral platform that connects freight shippers and freight carriers, the organizational structure and operational mode of network freight platforms differ substantially from those of traditional logistics service providers. In this paper, a tripartite evolutionary game model is constructed in which a network freight platform, freight shipper, and freight carrier are considered, and the evolutionary stability strategies of the parties and the tripartite system are dynamically analyzed. The reliability of the model is verified through a numerical case, and several countermeasures have been proposed to improve the stability of the system based on the sensitivity analysis of important parameters. This paper helps standardize the principal behavior of all parties under the network freight mode, reduce the default risk of all parties, and improve the overall cooperation stability of the logistics service supply chain.

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Section: Research On the Behavior Of Carriers Shippers Andmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of a Logistics Service Supply Chain Cooperation Mechanism for Network Freight Platforms

Wang,

Hu,

Wang

et al. 2024

International Journal of Intelligent Systems

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“…Some scholars have also conducted researched joint intelligent transformation. For example, Liu et al [32] studied the influence of power structure and intelligent logistics-service level on the strategy of logistics-service platforms from the perspective of collaborative innovation. From an ecological perspective, Liu et al [33] used evolutionary game theory to analyze the dynamic cooperation-evolution trend of smart logistics platforms and intelligent LSPs.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Referring to the literature [24,34], this paper defines the demand function as q = a − bp + ky; among them, a is the basic demand of the logistics-service market, k is the consumer's preference for the intelligent level of logistics services, and b is the price-sensitivity coefficient. Referring to [24,32], we assume that when the level of logistic-service intelligence is y, the cost invested by the LSP is gy 2 /2, indicating that it is more and more difficult to stimulate the market with the increase in intelligence level. The notations related to this paper are shown in Abbreviations.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…To ensure that the results of each decision model are non-negative, similar to the literature [24,32,57], we assume p > w, a − bc(1 + r) > 0 and 2bg(1 + r) − k 2 > 0. Generall speaking, the intelligent transformation of logistics services requires a huge cost.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…(3) When enterprises make optimal decisions, in addition to considering the impact of consumers' wisdom preferences on demand, they should also pay attention to the impact of prices on demand and formulate reasonable logistics-service prices so as to gain the market initiative. In addition, our research also has some theoretical contributions, which are as follows: Firstly, existing articles on the intelligent transformation of logistics services rarely consider the situation of capital constraint [24,32,34]; although Conclusion (1) and Conclusion (2) are similar to those in Ref. [34], the difference is that the equilibrium-decision results are different, and our research on intelligent-transformation decision-making regarding logistics services under capital constraint has realized the extension of the existing theoretical research dimension.…”

Section: Key Findings and Managerial Implicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Coordination Decision-Making for Intelligent Transformation of Logistics Services under Capital Constraint

et al. 2023

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The intelligent transformation of logistics plays a significant role in meeting the diverse needs of customers, improving operational efficiency, and reducing carbon emissions in logistics activities. Therefore, to achieve sustainable development, logistics enterprises need to face the decision-making problem of intelligent logistics transformation. In this paper, we construct a Stackelberg game model between a financially constrained logistics-service provider (LSP) and a well-funded logistics-service integrator (LSI) and discuss the impact of the wholesale price contract, the cost-sharing contract, the revenue-sharing contract, the two-part tariff contract, and the hybrid cost-sharing and revenue-sharing contract on the intelligence level of logistics services, the profits of supply-chain members, and the channel for logistics-service demand. We found that the cost-sharing contract and the revenue-sharing contract cannot achieve Pareto improvement in the profits of supply-chain members. In addition, the increase in bank-loan interest rates would seriously weaken the level of intelligence and market demand for the entire logistics service. However, when consumers do not have high requirements for the intelligence of logistics services, the two-part power–price contract can create a win–win situation for supply-chain members and increase market demand within a certain range; on the contrary, a hybrid contract of cost sharing and revenue sharing is the best choice. Moreover, in the process of contract design for the intelligent transformation of logistics services, it is necessary to pay attention to the influence of the price-sensitivity coefficient on decision-making.

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Organizational Culture: The Hidden Competitive Advantage and the Key to Innovation for Greek Logistics

Papaevangelou,

Tsarouhas

2024

Communications in Computer and Information Science

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The influence of leadership and smart level on the strategy choice of the smart logistics platform: a perspective of collaborative innovation participation

Cited by 15 publications

References 40 publications

Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of a Logistics Service Supply Chain Cooperation Mechanism for Network Freight Platforms

Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of a Logistics Service Supply Chain Cooperation Mechanism for Network Freight Platforms

Coordination Decision-Making for Intelligent Transformation of Logistics Services under Capital Constraint

Organizational Culture: The Hidden Competitive Advantage and the Key to Innovation for Greek Logistics

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