The influence of local government decision-making competition on enterprise innovation investment under information asymmetry and multiple risk appetite type

Wu, Shaoyu; Wang, Dong

doi:10.1108/k-07-2016-0177

Cited by 10 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…In some extent, similar characteristic of this process can be observed within the structure of classical economic games in the literature, such as the Gibbons (1992) descriptions, Rubinstein (1982) and Sobel and Takahashi (1983) sequential bargaining models and Von Stackelberg (1934) model of duopoly. Some recent game approaches have similar characteristics with the present modeling (Brangewitz and Gamp, 2013;Bolton and Karagözo glu, 2016;Geraskin, 2017;Nepomuceno and Costa, 2014;Santos et al, 2017;Wu and Wang, 2017) The negotiation will be characterized as a dynamic negotiation of complete and perfect information, which means that not only each negotiator has the complete information on the payoff function of his/her counterpart, but also the entire history behind the negotiation so far (strategies adopted, interactions, moves and choices) is of common knowledge (Gibbons, 1992). The timing of the bargain goes as follows:…”

Section: Sequential Bargains With Asymmetric and Mutual Negotiation Knowledgementioning

confidence: 88%

Modeling sequential bargains and personalities in democratic deliberation systems

Nepomuceno¹,

Moura

Costa

2018

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Purpose This paper aims to introduce a negotiation support system (NSS) with a theoretical modeling that considers the aspects of human personality and negotiator’s behavior to assist the decision-making of public managers and stakeholders in democratic bargaining processes and support social-efficient outcomes. Design/methodology/approach A game theoretical modeling of public participatory negotiations characterized by complete and perfect information is explored with the inclusion of personality aspects and negotiation styles. The importance of the negotiation knowledge disclosure in the sequential bargains of participative budgeting is highlighted by an experiment with 162 state-owned companies’ managers and graduate students to present the contribution of the system’s applicability. Findings A considerable number of Pareto-efficient deliberation agreements are obtained with few interactions when the negotiation strategies and the personality aspects of opponents and stakeholders are freely available (a symmetry in the public negotiation knowledge). In addition to the set of Pareto-efficient agreements, those with the best social outcome (i.e. that maximize the group satisfaction despite individual losses) are observed when the informational tool for personality and negotiation style inference is enabled. Originality/value Many scholars argue for Pareto-efficient allocation instead of equal divisions of resources within participative democracies and public governance. This work provides a new system with an empirical application and theoretical modeling which may support those arguments based on the nonverbal negotiation aspects.

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Section: Sequential Bargains With Asymmetric and Mutual Negotiation Knowledgementioning

confidence: 88%

Modeling sequential bargains and personalities in democratic deliberation systems

Nepomuceno¹,

Moura

Costa

2018

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“…Second, the central government has more power and rights in decision making, supervision, assessment, and deployment [7]. In contrast, the lower governments maintain mastery over information about the situation in local areas [42]. The two sides are asymmetric in information and power.…”

Section: The Impact Of Central-local Relations On Co-production Projectsmentioning

confidence: 99%

How Do Political Features Influence the Co-Production of Government Projects? A Case Study of a Medium-Sized Chinese City

Jong

2021

Sustainability

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Co-production is a solution by which the government provides public services. Co-production theory is built upon Western experience and currently focuses on the types of co-production in different policy stages, the barriers and governance strategies for co-production. However, little attention is paid to how political background will influence the co-production process. To fill the gap, we analyzed a case of co-production that occurred in China, and we characterized the political background as consisting of three main political features: political mobility, central–local relations, and performance measurement. Based on an in-depth case study of a government project in a medium-sized Chinese city, the impact and the changes of political features affecting governmental projects in different co-production stages are analyzed and assessed. We find that political features play a critical role in the co-production of China’s large government projects and may separately and jointly affect co-production. Government performance measurement affects the co-design and co-implementation of projects. Political mobility and changes in local government and performance measurement also affect the co-implementation continuity of the project. Political focus affects the co-design of projects. Central-local relations influence the support from higher government and the actual practices of lower government in the co-implementation stage.

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“…Some researchers used game theory for analyzing investment strategies in competitive conditions (Morellec and Schürhoff, 2011;Arasteh, 2016). The impact of the government decisionmaking using the game approach are discussed by research studies such as Hafezalkotob et al (2018) and Wu and Wang (2017). Although there are several related studies about the stability of game theory models (Chu et al, 2018;Zhang et al, 2018;Zhou et al, 2018;Zutshi et al, 2018), we mainly focused on the studies about government intervention policies using the game theoretic framework.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Government intervention policies in competition of financial chains: a game theory approach

Reza‐Gharehbagh

Hafezalkotob

Makui

et al. 2019

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Purpose This study aims to analyze the competition of two financial chains (FCs) when the government intervenes in the financial market to prohibit the excessively high-interest rate by minimizing the arbitrages caused by speculative transactions. Each FC comprises an investor and one intermediary, attempts to finance the capital-constrained firms in financing needs. Design/methodology/approach Using a Stackelberg game theoretic framework and formulating two- and three-level optimization problems for six possible scenarios, the authors establish an integrative framework to evaluate the scenarios through the lens of the two main decision-making structures of the FCs (i.e. centralized and decentralized) and three policies of the government (i.e. speculation minimizing, revenue gaining and utility maximizing). Findings Solving the problem results in optimal values for tariffs, which guarantee a stable competitive market. Consequently, policymaking by the government influences the decision variables, which is shown in a numerical study. The authors find that the government can orchestrate the FCs in the competitive market by imposing tariffs and prohibiting high-interest rates via regulating the speculation impacts, which guarantees a stable market and facilitates the financing of capital-constrained firms. Research limitations/implications This paper aids the financial markets and governments to control the interest rate by minimizing the speculation level. Originality/value This paper investigates the impact of government intervention policies – as a leading player – on the competition of FCs – as followers – in providing financial services and making profits. The government imposes tariffs on the interest rate to stabilize the market by limiting speculative transactions. The paper presents the mathematical models of the optimization problems through the game-theoretic framework and comparison of the scenarios through a numerical experiment.

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The influence of local government decision-making competition on enterprise innovation investment under information asymmetry and multiple risk appetite type

Cited by 10 publications

References 18 publications

Modeling sequential bargains and personalities in democratic deliberation systems

Modeling sequential bargains and personalities in democratic deliberation systems

How Do Political Features Influence the Co-Production of Government Projects? A Case Study of a Medium-Sized Chinese City

Government intervention policies in competition of financial chains: a game theory approach

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