I investigate firms' decisions to make disclosure commitments before realizations of signals in the market for initial coin offerings (ICOs). The blockchain technology allows entrepreneurs to make irreversible decisions to disclose their transaction details with investors before the transactions take place. Such decisions are coded into computer programs, known as 'smart contracts,' which become immutable once deployed on blockchains. I manually collected and analyzed the 'smart contract' code of 2085 ICO projects. I find that ICOs that make more disclosure commitments with this technology are more likely to reach fundraising goals and to deliver preliminary products, consistent with that firms' choices of information quality, e.g., auditor quality, affect their IPO prices (Titman and Trueman 1986). I also find that transaction volumes on blockchains predict ICO outcomes and that investors punish ICOs with suspicious volumes, e.g., volumes that show signs of automated trading. Collectively, these findings indicate that blockchains can function as a self-commitment device, which enhances firms' ability to convey private information to the market. I am indebted to my dissertation committee: Jenny Li Zhang (Chair), Russell Lundholm and Ralph Winter for their extensive advice and support. For additional guidance, I thank