The Innocence Effect

Gazal‐Ayal, Oren; Tor, Avishalom

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1878498

Cited by 13 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…2;Zimmerman & Hunter, 2018). Moreover, innocent and guilty participants may arrive at different expectations for conviction on the basis of available information (Bibas, 2004;Daftary-Kapur, Zottoli, & Faust, 2019;Gazal-Ayal & Tor, 2012). Thus, examining discount and PTS under different probabilities of conviction (either provided to or estimated by participants) is an important avenue for future research.…”

Section: Limitations and Future Directionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…1; Tor, Gazal‐Ayal, & Garcia, ). While innocent mock defendants are substantially less likely to plead guilty – even when it may be in their best interest to do so (a phenomenon that has been dubbed the Innocence Effect ; Gazal‐Ayal & Tor, ) – false guilty pleas in the laboratory have been observed to increase when the plea sentence is sharply discounted from the potential trial sentence (Bordens, ) and as potential trial sentence becomes more severe relative to the plea sentence (Zimmerman & Hunter, ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In an examination of 466 exoneration cases, Gazal-Ayal and Tor (2012) found that despite a 'remarkable reluctance' to plead guilty, innocent defendants were willing to acquiesce to offers of leniency in certain circumstances, including when the disparity between plea and potential trial sentence was large. Laboratory studies largely mirror these real-world findings (Bordens, 1984;Dervan & Edkins, 2013;Gazal-Ayal & Tor, 2012;Gregory, Mowen, & Linder, 1978, Exp. 1;Tor, Gazal-Ayal, & Garcia, 2010).…”

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confidence: 99%

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Disentangling the effects of plea discount and potential trial sentence on decisions to plead guilty

Schneider

Zottoli

2019

Legal Criminol Psychol

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Background Most criminal convictions are a result of guilty pleas. Concerns have been raised that large differentials between plea and potential trial sentences can be coercive to some defendants, especially when the threat of potential trial sentence is very large. The limited research, to date, suggests that the likelihood of pleading guilty goes up with increasing size of potential trial sentence. However, existing studies have failed to separate the effects of trial sentence and plea discount; as a result, in almost all studies, large potential trial sentences are paired with large discounts and small trial sentences with small discounts, making it difficult to know how the threat of trial sentence actually affects defendant decisions. Method In this study, we examined the effects of guilt, magnitude of potential trial sentence (5 years and 25 years), and size of plea discount (20%, 50%, and 75%) in a fully crossed, between‐subjects design, with acceptance of plea offer as the dependent variable. Results We found that potential trial sentence and plea discount had independent and opposite effects on plea decisions, with discount carrying the most weight. Specifically, participants accepted more plea offers in higher relative to lower discount conditions and when potential trial sentence was 5 years rather than 25 years. The pattern of effects was similar for participants in guilty and innocent conditions. Implications Our results run somewhat counter to conventional wisdom on how discount and potential trial sentence affect plea decisions and suggest that, given similar discounts, the likelihood for pleading guilty may be higher for defendants facing less serious charges that carry less severe sentences. We discuss the policy and research implications of these data.

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Section: Limitations and Future Directionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

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Disentangling the effects of plea discount and potential trial sentence on decisions to plead guilty

Schneider

Zottoli

2019

Legal Criminol Psychol

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“…Gazal-Ayal and Tor (2012) have argued that, ceteris paribus, innocent defendants are more likely to reject plea bargains compared to guilty defendants. Explanations for this "innocence effect" center on the fact that innocent defendants may: (1) reach legitimately different assessments of trial outcomes due to private information; (2) be irrationally optimistic about their prospects (i.e., underestimate θ); and/or (3) maintain their innocence as a matter of principle (Gross 2011;Tor et al 2010).…”

Section: Innocence and Defendants' Perception Of Judgment Errormentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Our method can also be used to inform recent attempts to assess the "shadow trial" model (Abrams 2011;Bushway and Redlich 2012;Ulmer and Bradley 2006) and the "innocence effect" (Gazal-Ayal and Tor 2012). The shadow trial approach seeks to model the plea bargain decision as a rational one based on the perceived probable outcome of the trial.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Plea Bargaining and the Miscarriage of Justice

2019

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Objectives We examine whether, on average, plea bargaining encourages guilty pleas among defendants who are factually innocent. Methods We develop a formal theory of plea bargaining in which defendants take into account the possibility of false convictions or acquittals when making plea-bargain decisions. We use an incidentally truncated bivariate probit model to test the theory, which predicts that if innocent defendants plead guilty, the correlation (ρ) between the unobserved heterogeneity regarding selection into trial and regarding conviction at trial should be sufficiently positive. The method does not require knowledge of whether individual defendants are factually guilty or innocent. Since ρ is also predicted to vary directly with the unobserved toughness of prosecutors, we develop a decomposition theorem to distinguish between the effects of defendants and prosecutors in plea bargain decisions. Results Using data on 2012 criminal cases decided in Israeli courts from 2010 to 2011, we find that ρ is large and positive. Hence, defendants who did not plea bargain were positively selected in terms of conviction. This means that defendants who accepted plea bargains had smaller counterfactual conviction probabilities than observationally similar defendants who went to trial. ConclusionsThe results indicate that, on average, factually innocent defendants in Israel during this period took plea bargains instead of going to trial. This contradicts "innocence effect" theory, which predicts that factually innocent defendants, on average, reject plea bargains. Our findings are important for research on shadow trial theory, since they show that selection into plea bargains cannot be ignored when inferring counterfactual trial outcomes for plea bargainers.

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The psychology of defendant plea decision making.

Redlich

Bibas

Edkins

et al. 2017

American Psychologist

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Every day, thousands of defendants, prosecutors, and defense attorneys must make guilty plea decisions, such as whether to accept a plea offer or proceed to trial. Most defendants opt to plead guilty; approximately 95% of state and federal convictions result from guilty pleas. In light of a newly emerging body of research and recent Supreme Court decisions on guilty pleas, this article asks and answers 2 questions: First, who pleads guilty and why? We describe the characteristics of those who are more or less likely to plead guilty, and examine the reasons why individuals plead guilty instead of proceeding to trial, exploring the cognitive, social influence, and developmental factors that underlie decision making. Second, are defendants' plea decisions valid, in that the decisions are made knowingly, intelligently, voluntarily, and with a factual basis of guilt? That is, do defendants who plead guilty understand and appreciate the conditions and consequences of their pleas, as required by law? Are innocent people induced to plead guilty to crimes they did not commit? We conclude with suggestions to move the field of plea research forward. (PsycINFO Database Record

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The Innocence Effect

Cited by 13 publications

References 10 publications

Disentangling the effects of plea discount and potential trial sentence on decisions to plead guilty

Disentangling the effects of plea discount and potential trial sentence on decisions to plead guilty

Plea Bargaining and the Miscarriage of Justice

The psychology of defendant plea decision making.

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