1996
DOI: 10.1080/0305724960250302
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

The Inseparability of Morality and Well‐being: the duty/virtue debate revisited

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1
1

Citation Types

0
7
0

Year Published

2000
2000
2015
2015

Publication Types

Select...
4
3

Relationship

1
6

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 13 publications
(7 citation statements)
references
References 4 publications
0
7
0
Order By: Relevance
“…To the contrary, many students showed evidence of metacognitive strategies as they evaluated the dissonance they faced in cases where their empathy toward others was in conflict with their stated positions or principles. Reasoning understood in this manner constitutes a form of value-centered practical rationality (Milligan, 1980;Keefer, 1996;Keefer & Olson, 1995;Raz, 1998).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…To the contrary, many students showed evidence of metacognitive strategies as they evaluated the dissonance they faced in cases where their empathy toward others was in conflict with their stated positions or principles. Reasoning understood in this manner constitutes a form of value-centered practical rationality (Milligan, 1980;Keefer, 1996;Keefer & Olson, 1995;Raz, 1998).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It is important to note how different theoretical orientations or emphases will stake out different challenges or problems for investigation. This is not an unfamiliar story, as it is one that clearly differentiates deontic from classical, virtue-ethic approaches (Keefer, 1996).…”
Section: Wilks Keefermentioning
confidence: 98%
“…52-53) Classical theory differs in both its subjective and objective aspects. Most moral values are like all other values; we can acquire knowledge of them only through active personal engagement with them (Keefer, 1996). Yet, while classical theory emphasizes the agent's active pursuit of values, how actions are evaluated as good or valuable derive only from the value of the goal pursued and not, say, by any quality of will or desire of the agent pursuing the goal.…”
Section: Introduction: Contrasting Domain and Classical Theorymentioning
confidence: 97%
“…There is no conceptual difference to be made between the knowledge needed to understand what morally matters to others and the knowledge we need to understand what is relevant to our own moral benefit. That is, acquiring practical or functional knowledge of our own valuable pursuits instructs us in the duties that we owe to others, just as being able to identify the duties we owe to others requires knowing what is necessary for living a meaningful life (Keefer, 1996). Second, classical theory provides a wider or more inclusive characterization of the moral domain.…”
Section: Looking Forward Towards the Past: Can A Classical "Virtue-etmentioning
confidence: 99%