The institutionalization of relative advantage: formal institutions, subconstitutional presidential powers, and the rise of authoritarian politics in Russia, 1994–2012

Abstract

What role do formal institutions play in the consolidation of authoritarian regimes such as the Russian Federation? Oftentimes, it is assumed that autocrats, usually potent presidents, wield informal powers and control far flung patron-client networks that undermine formal institutions and bolster their rule. After the institutional turn in authoritarianism studies, elections, parties, legislatures, or courts have taken center stage, yet presidencies and public law are still on the margins of this research paradigm. This paper proposes a method for measuring subconstitutional presidential power and its change by federal law, decrees, and Constitutional Court rulings as well as a theoretical framework for explaining when and under which conditions subconstitutional presidential power expands. It is argued that as a result of a gradual, small-scale, and slow-moving process of layering, presidential powers have been accumulated over time. This furthers the institutionalization of presidential advantage toward other federal and regional institutions, which in turn contributes to the consolidation of authoritarianism.

Institutionalising Authoritarian Presidencies: Polymorphous Power and Russia’s Presidential Administration

“…Nominations and appointments are among the most powerful instruments at a president's disposal. Beside those appointment powers already stipulated in the constitution, the presidency over the time has accumulated even more powers (Burkhardt 2017), for example, to appoint top managers in state corporations or additional posts in state organs. The basic issue of selecting between two archetypes is relevant across regime types: professional appointees based on meritocracy, or patronage appointees based on personal acquaintance and loyalty.…”

“…Another objection is that actors and their personalised relationships trump official hierarchies: 'formal positions mattered less than the shifting patterns of influence that focused around the president himself, and the struggles for influence that intensified whenever the president was indisposed' (White 1997, p. 52). Nevertheless, similar to formal institutions in general, such as constitutions and laws (Frye 1997;Burkhardt 2017), these macro-structural arrangements in the Kremlin were the object of power struggles, and the fact that they were amended several times during the period of study indicates that they must be meaningful, otherwise actors would not have invested the scarce resources available to change them.…”

“…Third, assignment numbers picked up again, in particular, as of 2006, which was again paralleled by decrees, parliamentary legislation, and even 1993-1998 and 2010-2012. decisions of the Constitutional Court. Because of the rise of the pro-presidential UR and an absence of intra-executive conflict between the Presidential Administration and the government, this surge can be attributed to increased policy activity in fields such as the economy by means of state dirigisme, but also in domains such as military, law enforcement and security (Burkhardt 2017). This increased use of formal policy instruments also calls into question arguments about the increasing deinstitutionalisation of the regime and the prevalence of informal practices.…”