The intentionality of memory

Fernández, Jordi

doi:10.1080/00048400600571695

Cited by 80 publications

(30 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…I borrow these terms from EndelTulving (1972).3 I discuss two other aspects of the phenomenology of episodic memory inFernandez (2006).Memory and time 335…”

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confidence: 99%

Memory and time

Fernández

2007

Philos Stud

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The purpose of this essay is to clarify the notion of mnemonic content. Memories have content. However, it is not clear whether memories are about past events in the world, past states of our own minds, or some combination of those two elements. I suggest that any proposal about mnemonic content should help us understand why events are presented to us in memory as being in the past. I discuss three proposals about mnemonic content and, eventually, I put forward a positive view. According to this view, when a subject seems to remember a certain event, that event is presented to her as making true a perceptual experience that caused the very memory experience that she is having.

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“…I borrow these terms from EndelTulving (1972).3 I discuss two other aspects of the phenomenology of episodic memory inFernandez (2006).Memory and time 335…”

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confidence: 99%

Memory and time

Fernández

2007

Philos Stud

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“…Notes 1 See, however, Fernández ( 2006 ) for some concerns. The picture of the relation between time and memory that emerges from our discussion throughout the last three sections is that memory is closely related to time, but perhaps that connection is not as tight as it might have seemed at fi rst glance.…”

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confidence: 99%

Memory

Fernández¹

2013

A Companion to the Philosophy of Time

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“…Various theorists have proposed views according to which the content of an episodic memory belief refers to the experience of the agent in which the remainder of the content originates; Fernández (2006) (see also Fernández 2008a,b), e.g., defends a view according to which the content of a memory that an agent S would express by saying that she remembers that P is an ordered pair <having had a veridical perception that P, S >, that is, e.g., something like I saw that P. If something like this view is right, then my claim that the incorporation of accurate testimonial information into memory will normally result in a true belief is in trouble: given a reflexive view of episodic memory content, incorporation of accurate testimonial information will in fact normally result in a false memory belief. Suppose that an agent either failed to perceive the stop sign at the scene of an accident or misperceived it as a yield sign.…”

Section: The Truth Conditionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The information effect: constructive memory, testimony, and epistemic luck

Michaelian

2011

Synthese

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The incorporation of post-event testimonial information into an agent's memory representation of the event via constructive memory processes gives rise to the misinformation effect, in which the incorporation of inaccurate testimonial information results in the formation of a false memory belief. While psychological research has focussed primarily on the incorporation of inaccurate information, the incorporation of accurate information raises a particularly interesting epistemological question: do the resulting memory beliefs qualify as knowledge? It is intuitively plausible that they do not, for they appear to be only luckily true. I argue, however, that, despite its intuitive plausibility, this view is mistaken: once we adopt an adequate (modal) conception of epistemic luck and an adequate (adaptive) general approach to memory, it becomes clear that memory beliefs resulting from the incorporation of accurate testimonial information are not in general luckily true. I conclude by sketching some implications of this argument for the psychology of memory, suggesting that the misinformation effect would better be investigated in the context of a broader "information effect".The incorporation of post-event testimonial information into an agent's memory representation of the event via constructive memory processes gives rise to the misinformation effect, in which the incorporation of inaccurate testimonial information results in the formation of a false memory belief. While psychological research has focussed primarily on the incorporation of inaccurate information, the incorporation of accurate

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The intentionality of memory

Cited by 80 publications

References 5 publications

Memory and time

Memory and time

Memory

The information effect: constructive memory, testimony, and epistemic luck

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