The Interaction between Europe’s Legal Systems

Martinico, Giuseppe; Pollicino, Oreste

doi:10.4337/9781781005668

Cited by 41 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…56 If we talk about constitutional tolerance on the part of the EU, it expects from the CJEU to exercise judicial self-restraint with regard to the constitutional systems of Member States. 57 European judicial dialogue is a nice idea, but can only be considered if it is mutual and meaningful. 58 The CJEU could decrease the reservations expressed by constitutional courts by being more open to their essential constitutional concerns and establishing a higher or more intensive level of review for competence disputes.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Red Signal from Karlsruhe: Towards a New Equilibrium or New Level of Conflict?

Blutman

2020

CEJoCL

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In its PSPP decision, the German Constitutional Court for the first time declared an EU act ultra vires. The decision resulted in a flood of studies, blog posts, and comments. Most criticised the verdict raising a series of objections. We agree with some objections. However, the present study approaches the judgment from the other side. It seeks to understand the situation of the constitutional courts of Member States in the EU legal system, to examine their main dilemmas in relation to EU law, and to explore their possibilities regarding their main task, which is the protection of constitutions. The study highlights the fundamental structural tension that currently characterises the EU legal system concerning Member States’ sovereignty and examines how a balance can be struck in addressing this tension.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Red Signal from Karlsruhe: Towards a New Equilibrium or New Level of Conflict?

Blutman

2020

CEJoCL

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“…116 That the question was merely feigned and the existence of such margin of appreciation regarded as an acquis 117 also proves that the preliminary reference was an attempt to exercise a constitutional pressure on the European Court's interpretation, yet one that exhibits judicial comity. 118 Constitutional identity as selfhood consisting in the reflexive ability to define oneself in last instance, it does not directly challenge the European Court to surrender the primacy of EU law before a claim to constitutional supremacy. In contrast, the Court of Justice is given the opportunity to accommodate the domestic claim within the European discourse, leading to the issue of constitutional identity remaining silent.…”

Section: Selfhood: An Irenic and Efficient Claim For Constitutionalmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sameness and selfhood: The efficiency of constitutional identities in EU law

Sterck

2018

European Law Journal

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This article enquires into the formal dimension of constitutional identity by focusing not on what it consists of but on how it is expressed in the different discursive practices developed by constitutional courts. Contrasting constitutional identity as sameness and constitutional identity as selfhood shows that domestic courts can favour either a substantive determination of core constitutional features or a performative approach where the reflexive ability to define oneself prevails. Such a choice conditions the judicial strategies developed in the interactions with the Court of Justice, and their effectiveness. From this perspective, the accommodation in EU law, in light of the respect for Member States' national identity affirmed in Article 4(2) TEU, of these domestic identity claims rooted in the supremacy of the Constitution, depends less on what is asked for than on how it is asked for.

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“…Formally, such a review is a constitutional review, where the standard of review is formed by constitutional provisions concerning the international and EU obligations of France. An indirect standard of review is however the EU Directive itself 37 .…”

Section: The French Conseil Constitutionnelmentioning

confidence: 99%