The interaction effect of relational norms and agent cooperativeness on opportunism in buyer–supplier relationships

Abstract

In this study, we examined the effect of relational norms and agent cooperativeness on opportunism in buyer–supplier relationships. Drawing from the theoretical grounding of transaction cost economics, personality trait theory, and contingency theory, we proposed three distinct perspectives on opportunism mitigation in buyer–supplier relationships: (1) organizationalist, (2) individualist, and (3) interactionist, where relational norms, agent cooperativeness, and the interaction between them, respectively, serve as the key predictors in these three perspectives. The results of replicated experiments indicated that relational norms and agent cooperativeness interact with each other in mitigating opportunism and that the interactionist perspective yielded the highest explained variance in opportunism. This suggests that the interactionist perspective, a multi‐level theoretical lens encompassing the dynamic interplay between organization‐level and individual‐level factors, was a more complete model in explaining opportunism than either the organizationalist or individualist perspectives. The consensus which emerged from post‐experimental interviews of purchasing professionals is that agent personalities play an important role in buyer–supplier relationships. Some purchasing professionals had observed that uncooperative agents or personnel turnover in the boundary‐spanning functions can substantially undermine even established relational exchanges. These qualitative findings are in line with our theoretical arguments and experimental outcomes.

Opposites attract: organisational culture and supply chain performance

“…A widely accepted and useful approach is research based on preliminary statistical analysis to provide a platform for further analysis using the in-depth case method (Drejer et al, 1998;Pannerselvin et al;Tangpong et al, 2010). Post-experimental semi-structured interviews will help provide enrichment and validation to the preliminary findings (Yin, 2003;Eisenhardt, 1989).…”

Governance mechanisms in domestic and international buyer–supplier relationships: An empirical study

“…The paper reported herein examines a specific subset of governance mechanisms that is often discussed in marketing's relational exchange literature. These include formal written contracts (Cannon et al, 2000;Lusch & Brown, 1996;Stinchcombe, 1985), specific investments (De Wulf, Odekerken-Schröder, & Iacobucci, 2001;Gundlach, Achrol, & Mentzer, 1995;Jap & Ganesan, 2000), and relational norms (Andersen, Christensen, & Damgaard, 2009;Dant & Schul, 1992;Heide & John, 1992;Pilling, Crosby, & Jackson, 1994;Tangpong, Hung, & Ro, 2010).…”

Supply risk mitigation: a multi-theoretical perspective

“…Opportunism is defined as 'self-interest seeking with guile' (Williamson, 1975, p.6) which results in detrimental effects on supply chains such as disrupted production and degraded performance (Tangpong et al, 2010). In transaction cost economics, a crucial mechanism in deterring opportunism is relational-specific investment (Williamson, 1985).…”