The internal and external roles of Iraqi popular mobilization forces

El-Dessouki, Ayman

doi:10.5897/ajpsir2017.1042

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…The Iraqi state cannot manage to control the behavior and activities of armed, non-state actors, and its policy toward managing the challenge they pose has shifted over time (El-Dessouki, 2017). Its approach towards the militias, as organized under the umbrella of the PMF, changed drastically in 2014, when the state needed the militias' help in defeating ISIS.…”

Section: Popular Mobilization Forces From Reintegration To Autonomymentioning

confidence: 99%

Reconstrucción del Estado de posguerra: Irak después de ISIS como estudio de caso

Rached,

Jamil

2023

apolit

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La turbulencia política, el vacío de poder y los desafíos de seguridad que surgieron en Irak posterior a ISIS modificaron la estructura de poder del estado. El aparato de seguridad y las instituciones militares iraquíes por poco colapsan en 2014 y no pudieron resistir los desafíos que tuvieron que enfrentar desde ISIS. De manera simultánea, el gran clérigo chiita Sistani emitió una fatwa, llamó a los chiitas a las armas y luchó por su supervivencia. En esta situación desordenada, un número cada vez mayor de grupos armados respaldados por Irán han comenzado a manejar los desafíos de seguridad, la mayoría de los cuales operan de forma independiente por fuera de las agencias de seguridad nacional de Irak. El grupo más importante fue el de las Fuerzas de Movilización Popular (FMP), de la comunidad chiita iraquí. Las FMP se enredan gradualmente en los asuntos financieros y el sistema político de Irak y ejercen una tremenda influencia. Hay dos tipos de milicias relevantes en Irak: las milicias paramilitares Al-Atabat al-Muqadasa (MPAA) y las milicias leales (ML). En mayo de 2021, cuatro divisiones de MPAA decidieron integrarse al ejército iraquí, mientras que las ML cuentan con casi 70 divisiones diferentes y no se han integrado a las instituciones del gobierno. En este artículo, exploramos la posibilidad de implementar el modelo DDR para sociedades de posguerra como la iraquí y los obstáculos que enfrentaron. La integración de estos grupos armados se convirtió en una tarea complicada para el estado de Irak Post-ISIS. En primer lugar, examinamos la historia del proceso de construcción del Estado. Luego, desarrollamos un marco conceptual para el artículo. En tercer lugar, identificamos los factores que dan forma a los resultados de DDR, definimos el papel de las Fuerzas de Movilización Popular (FMP) y analizamos cómo sus actividades se convirtieron en un obstáculo para reconstruir el estado iraquí en la era posterior a ISIS.

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Section: Popular Mobilization Forces From Reintegration To Autonomymentioning

confidence: 99%

Reconstrucción del Estado de posguerra: Irak después de ISIS como estudio de caso

Rached,

Jamil

2023

apolit

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“…The UAE’s leaders have been the most forceful in condemning Iran’s “aggressive policies.” The UAE sees Iran and its network of proxy forces in Yemen, Lebanon and Iraq as the primary threat in the region and have worked together to cripple its economy through sanctions and to isolate its leadership (Ibish, 2017). For example, El-Dessouki (2018, pp. 277-280) demonstrated how the Iranian-linked militias in the Middle East pose threats to GCC security, collectively and individually.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Small states and strategic hedging: the United Arab Emirates’ policy towards Iran

El-Dessouki

Mansour

2020

REPS

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to unveil the main changes in the UAE’s policy towards Iran since its foundation in 1971. The UAE favored strategic hedging, extending its commercial and diplomatic relations with Iran, in addition to developing its military capabilities and maintaining military/security alliances with Saudi Arabia and the USA. However, the UAE started to reorient its policy towards Iran by adopting some sort of balancing strategy in the aftermath of the Arab Spring of 2011. This paper examines how and why the UAE had to change course and explores whether it would revert back to strategic hedging with Iran. Design/methodology/approach The study will be carried out based on a theoretical framework drawn from strategic hedging theory, a new structural theory in international relations, to examine the shifts in UAE policy towards Iran. Previous literature suggests that small states prefer hedging over balancing or bandwagoning. The authors also undertake a descriptive analysis and deploy a longitudinal within-case method to investigate changes in UAE policy towards Iran and identify the causal mechanisms behind these changes. That method allows investigating the impact of a particular event on a case by comparing the same case before and after that event occurred. Findings The main finding of this study is that the UAE hedging strategy towards Iran allowed maximizing the political and economic returns from the cooperation with Iran and mitigating the long-range national security risks without breaking up the consistent and beneficial ties with other regional and global powers. Hedging achieved the desired outcome, which is preventing direct military confrontation with Iran. Hard balancing, adopted by Abu Dhabi after the 2011 Arab Spring, has proved to have some negative effects, most importantly provoking Tehran. Some recent indicators suggest, though that the UAE may revert back to its long-established hedging policy towards Iran. Originality/value Strategic hedging is a new structural theory in international relation, although hedging behavior in states’ foreign policies is far from new. It is new enough, thus, not have been researched sufficiently, strategic hedging still needs theorizing and comparison. This paper highlights the importance of strategic hedging as the most appropriate strategy for small states. It provides an important contribution to the application of the theory to the case of UAE policy towards Iran. The paper also assesses the conventional wisdom that small states prefer hedging over balancing in the light of the changes in the UAE foreign policy since 2011.

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The internal and external roles of Iraqi popular mobilization forces

Cited by 2 publications

References 6 publications

Reconstrucción del Estado de posguerra: Irak después de ISIS como estudio de caso

Reconstrucción del Estado de posguerra: Irak después de ISIS como estudio de caso

Small states and strategic hedging: the United Arab Emirates’ policy towards Iran

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