The International Criminal Court and United States opposition

Abstract

While the International Criminal Court (ICC) has been touted as the most fundamental development in international society to date, there has been relatively little criminological research examining the potential influence of the ICC. Additionally, criminologists have neglected the United States' responses to the ICC. Our purpose is to fill that gap by examining the United States' role in the development of, and subsequent reactions to, the ICC. Moreover, we draw upon Chambliss' Structural Contradictions Model to explicate processes within the development of International Law, thereby expanding its utility. We begin with a brief discussion of the most contentious elements of the ICC for the United States, sovereignty and jurisdiction, followed by a review of the theoretical model utilized in our analysis. We then discuss the role of the United States in the development of the ICC followed by the proceeding actions taken against the Court. We suggest how US withdrawal and legislative undermining of the ICC not only reflects the US ambiguous relationship with international law but also reveals some of the inherent limitations placed on the ICC as an international institution of formal social control. We conclude with a criminological analysis of the Court's potential based on the existing Rome Statute and the recent efforts of the U.S. to thwart its efficacy.

BeyondBorders?

“…73 Wonders (2007), p 33 74 Chambliss and Zatz (1993). 75 Rothe and Mullins (2006). 76 Rothe and Mullins (2006).…”

Ironies of controlling state crime

“…In particular, he outlined how law enforcement officers, as state agents, can frustrate legitimate attempts by citizens to fight for social justice by engaging in confrontation, failing to enforce the law, and by surreptitious methods to force state opponents to break the law and thus be subject to arrest or pacification. Similarly, Rothe and Mullins (2006a) noted that attempts to control or block state criminality can and have resulted in state actors finding illegitimate means to achieve their goals, thus sidestepping legitimate means of control. Indeed, efforts to control or confront government wrongdoing may not have the intended chilling effect one hoped for: all too often, controls on state criminogenic agencies and practices can have unintended and undesirable effects.…”

Estados de impunidad. Una crítica “Fou-Cohen-tiana” de la guerra de Bush contra el terror

“…Funcionarios de la Casa Blanca, por ejemplo, se propusieron reescribir pasajes significativos del Estatuto de Roma, como el Artículo 98: en esta versión, se hace a la Corte impotente en cuanto a su jurisdicción sobre ciudadanos de Estados Unidos, personal militar y de mantenimiento de la paz en el extranjero. Estados Unidos declaró que consideraría revocar la ayuda militar y la asistencia a cualquier estado que se negara a aprobar la versión revisada del artículo 98 (Roth y Mullins, 2006a;2006b). Sumando a los cada vez mayores comentarios sobre el excepcionalismo estadounidense, un observador escribe: "La extraordinaria vendetta llevada adelante -en gran medida, pero no solamente, por John Bolton-contra la Corte Penal Internacional, mostró no sólo la paranoia de la administración Bush en torno a la posibilidad de que la ONU o la Corte pudieran acusar soldados y oficiales norteamericanos inocentes, sino también lo punitivo que Estados Unidos podría volverse en relación a Estados (aliados o no) que no estén dispuestos a satisfacer sus demandas" (Hoffman, 2005:229).…”