2014
DOI: 10.1080/13642987.2014.901310
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The International Criminal Court and the politics of prosecutions

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Cited by 40 publications
(8 citation statements)
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“…It also means taking into account selection effects-that is, the actors' knowledge that justice mechanisms are unlikely to work well in adverse settings, leading them to choose more appropriately tailored policies (Snyder & Vinjamuri 2003). Research shows, for example, that the politics that shapes impact often takes place in the pretrial phase, determining which cases come to trial, which do not, and when (Tiemessen 2014).…”
Section: Conclusion: Assessing the Impact Of Transitional Justicementioning
confidence: 97%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…It also means taking into account selection effects-that is, the actors' knowledge that justice mechanisms are unlikely to work well in adverse settings, leading them to choose more appropriately tailored policies (Snyder & Vinjamuri 2003). Research shows, for example, that the politics that shapes impact often takes place in the pretrial phase, determining which cases come to trial, which do not, and when (Tiemessen 2014).…”
Section: Conclusion: Assessing the Impact Of Transitional Justicementioning
confidence: 97%
“…In fact, ICC justice has been heavily critiqued for its selectivity and also for its proximity to the interests of powerful states (Bosco 2014, Tiemessen 2014). In the DRC and Uganda, researchers have argued that then Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo solicited referrals and that his success was secured by an implicit agreement that government crimes would not be investigated (Clark 2010b).…”
Section: Implementing Justicementioning
confidence: 99%
“…138 Likewise, although the ICC was initially heralded as helping to end impunity and ensure the more effective protection of global human rights, the institutional design and functioning of the Court in practice increasingly raises concerns over its politicisation and apparent Western bias. 139 In light of such concerns, it is hardly surprising that the new millennium brought with it an increasing academic focus on the question of the legitimacy of international institutions; 140 policy initiatives aimed at addressing questions of accountability and institutional responsibility; 141 as well as the emergence of new movements self-defined in terms of 'global constitutionalism' 142 and 'global administrative law', 143 the ethos of which is essentially to address the kind of rule of law concerns that arise from the apparent overreach of 'global governance' institutions. 144 Certainly, much of the concern surrounding the normative impact of such institutions and regimes stems from a perceived weakening of rule of law protections at the domestic level, as much as the international.…”
Section: The Rule Of Law As Institutional Ideal: the Emergence Of mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In the remainder of this section, I will probe three potential arguments for why the adoption of the noble lie is such a vital strategy: legitimacy, deterrence, and what I shall call "perverse incentive." The problem of legitimacy is one of the standard explanations for why the ICC must (allegedly) stay the hands of politics (Danner 2003;Fichtelberg 2006;Murphy 2009;Takemura 2012;Tiemessen 2014). As I have pointed out above, legitimacy is of crucial importance for the ICC: the Court depends on the cooperation and support of states (financially, enforcement of arrest warrants, etc.)…”
Section: The Disavowal Of Politics As a Noble Liementioning
confidence: 99%
“…One of these weaknesses is that these scholars often present a rather limited view of "politics" or "the political." What they routinely refer to is that the ICC is a "politicized Court" that cannot elude the political influence of internal or external actors (Köchler 2003;Roach 2006;Ainley 2011;Dana 2014;Tiemessen 2014Tiemessen , 2016. This, to be sure, is a vital aspect of the Court's political nature; but there is another dimension of "politics" at play here, one that is even more controversial and less frequently discussed than "politicization": this is the notion of the ICC as a "political actor."…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%